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I. Introduction
This article is an overview of the parole revocation process in
Pennsylvania. While the article will deal primarily with parole cases
coming under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, the principles of due process and relaxed evi-
dentiary rules are equally applicable to probation revocation hear-
ings in Common Pleas Courts and those parole cases involving parol-
ees having sentences of less than two years not coming under the
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Parole Board's jurisdiction.'
Probation and parole hold a significant place within the frame-
work of the criminal justice system. This was underscored by a 1985
study released by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, an agency of the
United States Department of Justice. According to that study, one
out of thirty-five adult men in the United States is either on proba-
tion, under parole supervision, or incarcerated. Of the more than 2.3
million men and 323,000 women in custody or under the supervision
of corrections authorities at the end of 1984, 1.7 million were on
probation and 268,500 were on parole.' Pennsylvania currently has
over 91,700 persons under probation of parole supervision of which
16,000 are under the supervision of the Pennsylvania Board of Pro-
bation and Parole.'
Parole has proven to be a cost-effective method of rehabilitating
prisoners. In 1986, it cost $12,950.00 to keep a person in a state
prison while the cost of supervising that person in the community
was approximately one-tenth of that amount." In addition, as a pa-
rolee, the prisoner can be a taxpaying member of the community and
a family provider as opposed to being a ward of the Commonwealth.
A. Concept of Parole
Parole is a fundamental public policy in Pennsylvania which
provides a prisoner with an opportunity to start anew in society and
may be a determinative step in a prisoner's rehabilitation, adjust-
ment, and restoration to social and economic life.5 The concept of
parole contemplates that when a trial court has determined that a
convicted offender should be imprisoned, the optimum duration of
that imprisonment can be best determined by an independent board.
That board should be well-acquainted with the prisoner's crime and
skilled in evaluating the prisoner's willingness to resume a construc-
tive place in the community. Through the use of parole, the Com-
monwealth realistically faces the fact that a prisoner, unless con-
I. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 314 (Purdon 1964) and PA. R. CRIM. P. 1409. The
Parole Board has the exclusive power to grant and revoke the paroles of prisoners who have a
maximum sentence of two years or more. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.17 (Purdon Supp.
1986); Commonwealth ex rel. Tate v. Burke, 364 Pa. 179, 71 A.2d 241 (1950).
2. Probation, Parole Being Used More, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 24, 1986, at 12-
A, col. I.
3. 1985 PA. BD. OF PROBATION & PAROLE ANN. REP. 26.
4. 1986 PA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS ANN. REP. 30; 1977-1978 PA. BD. OF PROBATION &
PAROLE BIANN. REP. 6.
5. Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 297, 328 A.2d 851, 856 (1974). See also PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.1 (Purdon 1964).
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demned to death or under a sentence of life imprisonment, will
someday be unconditionally released from prison. The prisoner's
chances of becoming a useful citizen at that time are best when
there has been a transitional period of conditional freedom under
sympathetic, yet objective, supervision.6
The essence of parole is a release from prison, before the com-
pletion of sentence, upon the condition that the prisoner abide by
certain rules during the balance of the sentence.7 While on parole,
the prisoner remains in the legal custody of the Commonwealth until
the expiration of the maximum term of the prisoner's sentence.' The
prisoner is considered to be still serving that sentence, albeit outside
of prison walls. A grant of parole therefore differs from a pardon in
that parole does not excuse the prisoner nor eliminate the sentence of
the trial court.9
B. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
The General Assembly of Pennsylvania created the Pennsylva-
nia Board of Probation and Parole, hereinafter referred to simply as
the Parole Board, in 1941 as a part of a comprehensive revision of
the parole system in the Commonwealth. ° The Parole Board is
structured as an independent administrative agency of the Common-
wealth directly responsible to the Governor. 1 The Parole Board is
comprised of five members with at least six years experience in the
parole or probation field, of which at least one year must be in a
supervisory or administrative capacity, who are nominated by the
Governor and approved by a majority vote of the Pennsylvania
Senate.2
The Parole Act vests the Parole Board with the exclusive state-
wide jurisdiction to grant, supervise, or revoke parole for prisoners
serving sentences with a maximum term of two years or more."3 Sec-
tion 4 of the Parole Act, as modified by the 1986 amendments to the
Parole Act, allows the Parole Board to exercise its authority to grant
6. Note, A Survey of the Law of Probation and Parole in Pennsylvania, 30 TEMPLE L.Q.
309 (1957).
7. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1972).
8. 37 PA. CODE § 63.3 (1986); Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Bookbinder, 213 Pa.
Super. 335, 247 A.2d 664 (1968).
9. Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Board of Parole, 409 Pa. 204, 185 A.2d 581
(1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 817 (1963).
10. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61 §§ 331.1-331.34 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
I1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.2 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
12. Id.
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.17 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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or revoke a parole through two-person panels comprised of at least
one Parole Board member and one hearing examiner, although a
majority vote of a quorum is required to conduct any other
business."'
Section 17 of the Parole Act"' is the specific section whereby
the General Assembly vested the Parole Board with the exclusive
jurisdiction to parole and revoke the paroles of prisoners subjected to
a maximum sentence of two years or more. This broad grant of au-
thority to the Parole Board has been upheld against constitutional
challenges in both Pennsylvania"0 and federal courts." Therefore,
once the trial court imposes a sentence with a maximum term of two
years or more, the court loses its power to parole the offender or
revoke a parole previously granted, and any attempt to do so by the
court is void ab initio.'
For administrative purposes, pursuant to its statutory author-
ity,1" the Parole Board has divided the Commonwealth into ten pa-
role districts. 20 Each district has its own supervisor who is in charge
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.4 (Purdon Supp. 1987); 1986 Pa. Legis. Serv. No. 7,
16, 17 (Purdon). The 1986 amendments to the Parole Act are contained in Act No. 1986-134,
which was signed by Governor Richard Thornburgh on October 9, 1986. Throughout the re-
mainder of this Article, the 1986 amendments will be referred to simply as "Act 134." See
generally Wile, Annual Survey of Significant Developments in the Law - Probation and
Parole, 58 PA.B.A.Q. 119, 120 (1987) [hereinafter Wile, 1987 Probation and Parole Survey].
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.17 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
16. Bachman v. Jeffes, 488 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Commonwealth v. Button,
332 Pa. Super. 239. 481 A.2d 342 (1984); Commonwealth ex rel. Savage v. Hendrick, 179 Pa.
Super. 601, 118 A.2d 233 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Koffel v. Pennsylvania Board of
Parole, 72 Dauph. 314 (Pa.C.P. 1959).
17. Gahagan v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 444 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
18. Commonwealth v. Bigley, 231 Pa. Super. 492, 331 A.2d 802 (1974); Tillman v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 48 Pa. Commw. 325, 409 A.2d 949 (1980). The
Parole Board may also obtain exclusive paroling jurisdiction over prisoners subject to several
consecutive sentences, each of which have maximum terms of less than two years. Under 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9757 (Purdon 1982), consecutive sentences are automatically aggre-
gated into a single sentence. Gillespie v. Department of Corrections, - Pa. Commw. -,
527 A.2d 1061 (1987). If the aggregated sentence has a maximum term of two years or more,
the Parole Board obtains exclusive parole authority over the prisoner. Ambrek v. Clark, 287 F.
Supp. 208 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.10 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
20. The ten parole districts, and the counties which they encompass, are as follows: Al-
lentown (Berks, Bucks, Lehigh, Montgomery, Northampton and Schuylkill); Altoona (Bed-
ford, Blair, Cambria, Clearfield, Fulton, Huntingdon, Mifflin and Somerset); Butler (Arm-
strong, Beaver, Butler, Clarion, Elk, Indiana, Jefferson and Lawrence); Chester (Chester and
Delaware); Erie (Crawford, Erie, Forest, McKean, Mercer, Venango and Warren); Harris-
burg (Adams, Cumberland, Dauphin, Franklin, Juniata, Lancaster, Lebanon, Perry and
York); Philadelphia (Philadelphia); Pittsburgh (Allegheny, Fayette, Greene, Washington and
Westmoreland); Scranton (Carbon, Columbia, Lackawana, Luzerne, Monroe, Pike, Susque-
hanna, Wayne and Wyoming); and Williamsport (Bradford, Cameron, Centre, Clinton,
Lycoming, Montour, Northumberland, Potter, Snyder, Sullivan, Tioga and Union). 1982 PA.
BD. OF PROBATION & PAROLE ANN. REP. 24.
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of parole operations, including supervision of parole agents in that
district.2 1 In addition to easing the administration of the parole sys-
tem, the districts provide an additional level of control over the pa-
rolee since one of the general conditions of parole requires parolees
to remain in the parole district to which they have been paroled;
parolees are not to leave that district without the prior permission of
the parole supervision staff.2
C. Granting Parole
The United States Supreme Court has held that there is no fed-
eral constitutional right to a grant of parole and that the question of
whether a prisoner has any entitlement, either constitutional or oth-
erwise, to parole is a matter of state law."3 Pennsylvania law has
been consistently interpreted as giving prisoners no right, constitu-
tional or otherwise, to a grant of parole upon the expiration of the
minimum term of their sentences.2 ' The only right a prisoner has is
to submit an application for parole and to have that application
fairly considered by the Parole Board.2 5 The Parole Board is not re-
quired to consider a prisoner for parole in the absence of a parole
application, even if the prisoner's minimum term has expired.26
The Parole Act requires the Parole Board to acquaint itself with
the circumstances of the prisoner's crime as well as the prisoner's
character, mental characteristics and environment.27 The sentencing
court transmits to the Parole Board a full and complete copy of the
record upon which the sentence is based with recommendations re-
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.11 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
22. 37 PA. CODE § 63.4(l) (1986).
23. Compare Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981) (no recognized right to parole
provided by Ohio law) with Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. -, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987)
(provisions of Montana parole law create an expectancy of release on parole and thus a liberty
interest) and Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (expectancy of parole
provided by Nebraska law entitled inmates to due process protection).
24. Commonwealth ex rel. Rawlings v. Botula, 260 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. Pa. 1966);
Commonwealth v. Brittingham, 442 Pa. 241, 275 A.2d 83 (1971); Commonwealth v. Gooslin,
280 Pa. Super. 384, 421 A.2d 775 (1980); Blair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role, 78 Pa. Commw. 41, 467 A.2d 71 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984); Barlip v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 45 Pa. Commw. 458, 405 A.2d 1338 (1979). But
see Comment, Federal Parole Decisionmaking: Judicial Review for the Fortunate and Few,
85 DIcK. L. REv. 501 (1981) (discusses the need for increased judicial oversight of the United
States Parole Commission's exercise of its discretion in the paroling decision).
25. Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 38, 483
A.2d 1044 (1984); Banks v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 4 Pa. Commw. 197
(1971).
26. Weyand v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa. Commw. 32, 503
A.2d 80 (1986); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.22 (Purdon 1964).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.19 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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garding parole.28 In addition, the Department of Corrections and
county corrections authorities are required to grant the Parole Board
access to prisoners coming under their jurisdiction and furnish it
with reports concerning the conduct of those prisoners."'
The Parole Act empowers the Parole Board to release prisoners
on parole when it would be in the prisoners' best interests and the
interests of the Commonwealth would not be injured.30 The Parole
Board evaluates the following five factors in making its paroling de-
cision: 1) the extent of risk to the community; 2) the nature of the
offense and the prisoner's prior criminal history; 3) the prisoner's job
potential and employment; 4) the prisoner's emotional and family
stability; and 5) the prisoner's adjustment to prison."1 Whenever the
Parole Board denies a parole application, it is required to notify the
prisoner in writing and provide the reasons for that denial. 2
Pennsylvania appellate courts have recognized that the granting
of parole is a purely administrative function of the Parole Board. 3
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania judiciary has given broad deference to
the expertise and discretion of the Parole Board in granting or deny-
ing parole applications and will not review a Parole Board order de-
nying a parole application.34 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court has stated that it will not review the Parole Board's exercise of
its discretion in acting on a parole application as long as the Parole
Board has acted within its grant of authority.
5
II. Federal Due Process Guarantees
The federal courts have held that the issue of whether a pris-
oner has a constitutionally recognized right in the possibility of pa-
role is dependent upon state law. For example, in, Jago v. Van
Curens3 the United States Supreme Court held that Ohio parole
statutes grant no such rights, while in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.18 (Purdon 1964).
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.20 (Purdon 1964).
30. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (Purdon 1964).
31. 1977-1978 PA. BD. OF PROBATION & PAROLE BIANN. REP. 6.
32. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.22 (Purdon 1964).
33. Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 501 A.2d
1110 (1985).
34. Reider v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. - , 514
A.2d 967 (1986) (en banc); LaCamera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 13 Pa.
Commw. 85, 317 A.2d 925 (1974) (en bane).
35. Barnhouse v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 89 Pa. Commw. 512, 492
A.2d 1182 (1985); LaCamera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 13 Pa. Commw.
85, 317 A.2d 925 (1974) (en banc).
36. 454 U.S. 14 (1981).
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Inmatess7 the Supreme Court found that Nebraska law creates a
constitutionally recognized right entitling inmates applying for pa-
role to due process protection. While the Pennsylvania Parole Act
has not been construed by the United States Siipreme Court, federal
courts have held that Pennsylvania law grants no constitutionally
recognizable right to a grant of parole upon the expiration of a pris-
oner's minimum sentence. 8
While a prisoner in Pennsylvania has no constitutionally recog-
nized or protected interest in the expectation of being granted pa-
role, once parole has in fact been granted and executed by the pris-
oner's release from incarceration, the new parolee obtains a
constitutionally protected liberty interest under the fourteenth
amendment 9 in the limited freedom that parole provides."' That
limited freedom may not be taken away or revoked by the Common-
wealth except for a breach of the conditions of parole followed by an
orderly process that satisfies certain minimal due process require-
ments of notice and an opportunity to be heard."1
The liberty interest recognized under the fourteenth amendment
vests only upon the prisoner's actual release from incarceration. A
prisoner who has an unexecuted grant of parole has no such liberty
interest, and the Commonwealth may constitutionally rescind that
grant of parole at any time prior to the prisoner's release from con-
finement without providing notice or a due process hearing."2
In Morrissey v. Brewer,4 the United States Supreme Court set
general guidelines for parole revocation procedures that provide the
due process protections which parolees are entitled to prior to having
their paroles extinguished. That decision involved the case of John
Morrissey who was sentenced in 1967 to not more than seven years
in prison as a result of his guilty plea to the charge of false drawing
37. 442 U.S. I (1979).
38. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Rawlings v. Botula, 260 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. Pa.
1966).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
40. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
41. Id. at 484-85.
42. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14 (1981); Franklin v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 83 Pa. Commw. 318, 476 A.2d 1026 (1984). The release from confinement
that results in the vesting of a protected liberty interest does not mean release from all confine-
ment. A prisoner subject to sentences in different jurisdictions may be granted parole on the
first and begin serving the sentence imposed by another jurisdiction. Thus, while the prisoner is
still confined, he is no longer confined on the original sentence, having been administratively
paroled to commence service of the other sentence. This "constructive parole" is sufficient to
vest a liberty interest in the prisoner despite his continued confinement. See Green v. Pennsyl-
vania Board of Probation and Parole, 101 Pa. Commw. 132, 515 A.2d 1006 (1986).
43. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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or uttering of checks. He was paroled from the Iowa State Peniten-
tiary in June 1968 but arrested in his home town seven months later
as a parole violator and confined to the county jail. The following
week, the Iowa Board of Parole, acting upon its review of Morris-
sey's parole officer's report," revoked his parole and returned him to
the penitentiary. At no time was he afforded a hearing on the as-
serted parole violations."' After exhausting his state remedies, Mor-
rissey filed a habeas corpus action in federal district court. The dis-
trict court denied the writ finding that the State's failure to provide
a hearing prior to parole revocation did not violate due process."' On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed by a four to
three vote. The majority held that since parole was only a corrective
device authorizing the service of a sentence outside of the peniten-
tiary, the parolee was still in custody. Therefore, prison authorities
must have broad discretion in making revocation decisions, and
courts should retain their traditional reluctance to interfere with dis-
ciplinary matters properly under the control of state prison
authorities.' 7
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the liberty of a pa-
rolee, however limited and indeterminate, includes many of the core
values of unqualified liberty and termination inflicts a grievous loss
upon the parolee and often upon others. The Court stated that, by
whatever name, liberty is valuable and must be seen as being within
the protection of the fourteenth amendment. The termination of that
liberty calls for some orderly process, however informal."8
The Court went on to note that the State has no interest in
revoking parole without some formal procedural guarantees. Society
has a stake in whatever may be the chance of restoring the parolee
to a normal and useful life within the law. Thus, society has an in-
terest in not having parole revoked because of erroneous information
or because of an erroneous evaluation of the need to revoke parole.
Society has a further interest in treating the parolee with basic fair-
ness to enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to
44. Morrissey's parole officer's report indicated that Morrissey had violated his parole by
buying a car under an assumed name and operating it without permission, giving false state-
ments to police concerning his address and insurance company after a minor accident, ob-
taining credit under an assumed name, and failing to report his place of residence. The report
further indicates that Morrissey admitted the truth of these allegations to his parole officer.
408 U.S. at 473.
45. Id. at 472-73.
46. Id. at 474.
47. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971).
48. 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972).
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arbitrariness.' 9 In analyzing what process is due a parolee, the Court
observed that there are two important stages in a typical parole revo-
cation process - the arrest of the parolee with a preliminary hear-
ing and the final revocation hearing.50
A. The Preliminary Revocation Hearing
The Morrissey Court envisioned the parole preliminary hearing
to be a minimal inquiry conducted at or near the place of the as-
serted parole violation or the arrest of the parolee. The preliminary
hearing should be held as promptly as convenient while information
regarding the asserted parole violation is fresh and available. The
Court saw the parole preliminary hearing as critical in determining
whether probable cause or reasonable grounds exist to believe the
parolee violated the conditions of parole. 1 Additionally, the Court
held that this preliminary determination should be made by someone
not directly involved in the case in order to assure an objective
determination. 2
The Court then went on to set down the following requirements
that due process required at the parole preliminary revocation hear-
ing: 1) notice to the parolee of (a) the time and place of the hearing,
(b) the specific parole violations that are asserted, and (c) that the
purpose of the hearing is to determine whether reasonable ground
exists to believe that the parolee committed the asserted parole viola-
tions; 2) the opportunity for the parolee to appear and speak in his
own behalf as well as to present relevant witnesses, documents or
letters; 3) upon the request of the parolee, persons having adverse
information upon which the revocation of parole is to be based are to
be made available to the parolee for confrontation and cross-exami-
nation, unless the hearing officer determines that the informant
would be subject to the risk of harm if the informant's identity were
disclosed; and 4) a written summary of the hearing that specifies the
reasons for the determination and the evidence relied upon in reach-
ing that determination shall be prepared by the hearing officer who
shall make the reasonable ground determination whether or not to
hold the parolee in custody for a final decision of the parole board
and such finding shall be sufficient to warrant the parolee's contin-
ued detention.58 Although the Court indicated that the hearing of-
49. Id. at 483-84.
50. Id. at 484-85.
51. Id. at 485, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-71 (1970).
52. Id. at 485-86.
53. Id. at 486-87.
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ficer's report should include the evidence relied upon and the reasons
for the hearing officer's determination, the Court specifically rejected
the notion that the hearing officer make formal findings of fact and
conclusions of law because no interest would be served by requiring
formalism at this stage of the revocation process. 54
B. The Final Revocation Hearing
The second stage of the typical parole revocation process envi-
sioned by the Morrissey Court is the final revocation hearing. At this
hearing, the parole authority would make the final decision as to
whether parole would be revoked. At this stage the contested facts
surrounding the alleged violation of parole are evaluated, and the
parole authority must consider whether the facts warrant revocation
of parole.55 This revocation hearing must be tendered within a rea-
sonable time after the parolee has been taken into custody for the
asserted parole violations.56
While preferring to leave the specifics to the individual states,
the Court did set forth the following minimum requirements of due
process with respect to the revocation hearing:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (c) oppor-
tunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral and
detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole board,
members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and
(f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence re-
lied upon and the reasons for revoking parole.'
The Morrissey Court also stressed that the parole revocation hearing
is not the equivalent of a criminal prosecution; consequently, the
Court relaxed evidentiary rules which permit admission of evidence
such as letters, affidavits, and other material not ordinarily admissi-
ble in an adversary criminal trial. 8 The Court emphasized that the
parole revocation hearing does not provide a forum for a parolee to
54. Id. at 487, citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271.
55. Id. at 488.
56. Id. While the Court did not specify what it considered to constitute a "reasonable"
time in which a parolee must be tendered a final revocation hearing after being taken into
custody, the Court did express the opinion that a period of two months was not unreasonable.
57. Id. at 489.
58. Id.
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relitigate a criminal conviction if that is the asserted violation of
parole.69
C. Right to Counsel0
While providing minimal due process standards for parole revo-
cations, the Morrissey Court specifically did not address the issue of
whether due process mandates that parolees be allowed the assis-
tance of counsel, either privately retained or publicly appointed, in
resisting the revocation of their paroles." That issue was reached by
the Court the following year in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.
62
A probationer, Gerald Scarpelli, was sentenced in Wisconsin to
fifteen years in prison following his guilty plea to the charge of
armed robbery. The trial court suspended that sentence, however,
and placed him on seven years probation. Scarpelli was permitted to
have his probation transferred to Illinois where he was accepted for
supervision on August 5, 1965. The next day, he and an accomplice
were arrested during the commission of a burglary. After being ad-
vised of his rights, Scarpelli confessed to the burglary. 3 Thereafter,
Wisconsin revoked his probation without a hearing on the basis of
the report submitted by Illinois authorities, and he was incarcerated
and began serving the fifteen year sentence previously imposed by
the trial court.
In December 1968, Scarpelli commenced a habeas corpus action
in federal district court in which he asserted that the revocation of
his probation without the benefit of a hearing or assistance of coun-
sel violated his due process rights. The district court agreed that the
lack of a prior hearing and assistance of counsel violated his due
process rights and granted the writ.64 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed by finding that due process requires states
to provide an indigent prisoner with appointed counsel at probation
revocation hearings.
65
While the Supreme Court agreed that Wisconsin violated
Scarpelli's due process rights by revoking probation without a hear-
ing, it disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that due pro-
59. Id. at 490.
60. See generally Wile, The Right to Counsel Under Pennsylvania Law in State Parole
Revocation Hearings, 91 DIcK. L. REv. 151 (1986) [hereinafter Wile Right to Counsel].
61. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
62. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
63. Id. at 780.
64. Scarpelli v. Gagnon, 317 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
65. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971).
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cess requires appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners at proba-
tion violation hearings. The Gagnon Court found that there is no
absolute right to be provided with appointed counsel at parole or
probation revocation hearings under either the sixth66 or the four-
teenth17 amendments, thus expanding its holding to include parolees
as well as probationers. In rejecting the per se rule favored by the
Seventh Circuit, the Court reasoned that the question of whether an
indigent parolee or probationer has a constitutional right to ap-
pointed counsel should be decided on a case-by-case basis. If the pa-
rolee's right to counsel does rise to a constitutional magnitude, the
basis of that right will be found in the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and not in the sixth amendment. 8
The Gagnon Court provided guidelines to determine whether a
parolee or probationer has a constitutional right to counsel in a revo-
cation proceeding. The Court opined that counsel should be provided
where the parolee or probationer makes a request based upon a
timely and colorable claim 1) that the parolee or probationer has not
committed the asserted violations of parole or probation; or 2) "that,
even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested,
there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the viola-
tion and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are
complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present." 9 The Court
also held that in doubtful cases the responsible agency, such as a
parole board, should consider whether the parolee or probationer ap-
pears capable of speaking effectively for himself. When a request for
appointed counsel is refused, the record should clearly indicate the
grounds for such refusal20
Both Morrissey and Gagnon remain the primary Supreme
Court pronouncements on the procedural due process to which a pa-
rolee is entitled under the fourteenth amendment when faced with a
possible revocation of parole. The remainder of this article will deal
with the framework under Pennsylvania law by which the Common-
wealth can revoke the limited freedom of a parolee.
III. The Revocation Process in Pennsylvania
The parole revocation process, insofar as it deals with parolees
66. U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
68. 411 U.S. 778, 790-91 (1973).
69. id.
70. Id.
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under the supervision of the Parole Board, has its foundation in three
distinct sources - statutory law, administrative regulations, and
court decisions.
A. The Statutory Framework
The power of the Parole Board to revoke the paroles of prison-
ers is found in two sections of the Parole Act, Sections 2171 and
21.1.72 Section 21 of the Parole Act merely empowers the Parole
Board to recommit to prison those parolees who are found to be in
violation of the conditions of parole and to reparole them when the
interests of the Commonwealth would not be adversely affected. Sec-
tion 21.1 was added to the Parole Act in 1951 and details the au-
thority of the Parole Board to recommit parolees for violations of
parole conditions and convictions for new criminal offenses. Section
21.1 categorizes parole violations into two separate and distinct
categories.
1. Convicted Parole Violators.-The first category is made up
of "convicted violators." A "convicted violator" is any parolee who
commits a crime punishable by imprisonment while serving a parole
term for which the parolee is convicted by being found guilty by a
judge or jury, or to which the parolee pleads guilty or nolo con-
tendere at any time thereafter in a court of record. The act of the
parolee that gives the Parole Board jurisdiction to revoke parole is
the commission of a crime while on parole. It is not necessary that
the parolee plead guilty or be convicted of the new crime while on
parole. Parole Board actions in revoking the parole of convicted vio-
lators after the expiration of their original sentence's maximum term
have been upheld by Pennsylvania appellate courts.73 In this way,
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21 (Purdon 1964). This statute reads, in pertinent part,
as follows:
§' 331.21. Power to parole; refusal of parole at expiration of minimum
term; recommitment and reparole
. . . Said [parole] board shall have the power during the period for which a
person shall have been sentenced to recommit one paroled for violation of the
terms and conditions of his parole and from time to time to reparole and recom-
mit in the same manner and with the same procedure as in the case of an origi-
nal parole or recommitment, if, in the judgment of the said board, there is a
reasonable probability that the convict will be benefited by again according him
liberty and it does not appear that the interests of the Commonwealth will be
injured thereby.
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21a (Purdon 1964).
73. Young v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 487 Pa. 428, 409 A.2d 843
(1977); Pyatt v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 30 Pa. Commw. 80, 374 A.2d
755 (1977); Kuykendall v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 26 Pa. Commw. 234,
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the parolee can not deprive the Parole Board of jurisdiction to revoke
parole by delaying the trial on the new criminal charges until the
expiration of the maximum term of the parole sentence. This is true
even if the parolee is not even arrested for the new charges until
after the expiration of the original sentence's maximum term.74
Section 21.1(a) of the Parole Act also gives the Parole Board
discretion in determining whether a convicted violator should have
parole revoked and be recommitted to prison. The fact that a parolee
commits a crime for which the parolee is subsequently convicted
does not mandate that the Parole Board revoke parole and return the
parolee to prison76 The primary purpose of a parole revocation hear-
ing, when the parolee has been convicted of a new crime, is to deter-
mine whether parole remains a viable means of rehabilitation, de-
spite the new conviction, and whether the parolee remains a good
parole risk. 6 The fact of the conviction has already been determined
by the criminal trial court and may not be relitigated before the Pa-
role Board."
(a) Time credits upon recommitment.-When a parolee is con-
victed of a new offense that was committed while on a parole term,
and the Parole Board decides to recommit the parolee to prison, Sec-
tion 21.1(a) requires that the parolee serve the entire remaining bal-
ance of the original sentence with no credit against the parolee's
original sentence for time served on parole. This portion of Section
21.1(a) authorizes the Parole Board to recalculate the maximum
term expiration date of the sentence of a parolee who is recommitted
to prison as a convicted violator. 78 This recalculation extends the
maximum term expiration date to account for the time that the pa-
rolee was not in prison serving that particular sentence. While the
recalculated maximum term expiration date is later than the original
date, the entire time spent in prison will not exceed the original max-
363 A.2d 866 (1976).
74. Carr v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 90 Pa. Commw. 312, 315 n.4,
494 A.2d 1174, 1176 n.4 (1985).
75. United States ex rel. Bogish v. Tees, 211 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1954).
76. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); O'Hara v. Pennsylva-
nia Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985); Simmons v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 74 Pa. Commw. 283, 459 A.2d 897 (1983).
77. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972); Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 49, 484 A.2d 413 (1984). See also Commonwealth v.
Brown, 503 Pa. 514, 469 A.2d 1371 (1983) (conviction of new crime constitutes a violation of
probation as a matter of law).
78. Simpson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 49 Pa. Commw. 178, 410
A.2d 957 (1980); Commonwealth ex rel. Rector v. Rundle, 84 Dauph. 91 (Pa.C.P. 1965).
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imum sentence, no matter how serious the parole violation. The Pa-
role Board does not have the power to alter the parolee's judicially-
imposed sentence and can only mandate that the parolee, upon re-
commitment as a convicted violator, serve the remaining balance of
the original sentence's unexpired term.7 9
Pennsylvania appellate courts have interpreted the phrase "at
liberty on parole" contained in Section 21.1(a) as meaning all times
that the parolee is not incarcerated on that particular sentence.8"
Therefore, when a parolee is subject to consecutive sentences and is
granted parole on the initial sentence and commences serving the
minimum term of the second sentence, the parolee is on "construc-
tive parole" on the initial sentence. He is not entitled to credit
against that initial sentence should the Parole Board later revoke his
parole as a convicted violator." Likewise, when the parolee is incar-
cerated following a new arrest and fails or is unable to post bail, that
time in jail is not credited to the initial sentence upon recommitment
as a convicted violator since the parolee was not confined solely due
to the Parole Board's warrant. 82 That pre-trial confinement time is
properly credited to the new sentence that the parolee receives upon
conviction of the subsequent crime, although, if the parolee is not
convicted, the time spent in jail is credited to his parole sentence. 83
The one possible exception to this general rule involves the situ-
ation in which a parolee attends an in-patient drug or alcohol treat-
ment center as a specific condition of parole imposed by the Parole
Board. In Cox v. Board of Probation and Parole,8 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court construed the "at liberty on parole" language of Sec-
tion 21.1(a) as allowing credit against a parolee's original sentence
for time spent in an in-patient drug or alcohol rehabilitation center.
79. Hawkins v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 88 Pa. Commw. 547, 490
A.2d 942 (1985); McClure v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 75 Pa. Commw.
176, 461 A.2d 645 (1983).
80. Hines v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 142, 420 A.2d 381
(1980); Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 44 Pa. Commw. 610, 404 A.2d
755 (1979); Haun v. Cavell, 190 Pa. Super. 346, 154 A.2d 257 (1959).
81. Hines v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 142, 420 A.2d 381
(1980); Commonwealth ex el. Jones v. Rundle, 413 Pa. 456, 199 A.2d 135 (1964) (per
curiam); Debnam v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 71 Pa. Commw. 572, 455
A.2d 297 (1983).
82. Zazo v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 80 Pa. Commw. 198, 470 A.2d
1135 (1984); Hairston v. Jacobs, 48 Pa. Commw. 117, 408 A.2d 1195 (1979).
83. Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412 A.2d 568
(1980); Sturtz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 71 Pa. Commw. 71, 453 A.2d
1093 (1983) (per curiam); Campbell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 48 Pa.
Commw. 454, 409 A.2d 980 (1980).
84. 507 Pa. 614, 493 A.2d 680 (1985), rev'g, 78 Pa. Commw. 183, 467 A.2d 90 (1983).
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The key inquiry to determine if the parolee should be given credit on
the original sentence upon recommitment as a convicted violator is
whether the constraints and restrictions placed upon the parolee's
liberty at the rehabilitation center make the parolee's time at the
center more akin to incarceration than the greater freedom of parole
subject to the general conditions of release, commonly referred to as
"street time.' ' 85
A seeming anomaly in the area of time credit is the possibility
for credit against a parolee's sentence for time spent at a drug or
alcohol rehabilitation center while credit for time actually spent in
prison on constructive parole is flatly prohibited. The restrictions on
the parolee's liberty are less onerous at the rehabilitation center than
those a parolee experiences in prison while on constructive parole.
The important distinction is that while at the rehabilitation center
the parolee is serving time only on the original sentence from which
parole was granted. A parolee on constructive parole is serving the
minimum term of another sentence while also serving parole on the
original sentence, thus the granting of time credit for constructive
parole would permit a parolee to convert two consecutive sentences
into concurrent sentences for the period of constructive parole.
Parolees who are recommitted by the Parole Board as technical
violators differ from those recommitted as convicted violators in that
they are entitled to credit against their original sentences for time
spent on parole in good standing. However, Section 21.1(b) man-
dates that a technical violator shall receive no credit against the
original sentence for time on parole during which the parolee was
delinquent or in absconder status. 6
(b) Order of service of sentences.-Section 21.1(a) also man-
dates that where the Parole Board imposes backtime upon a con-
victed violator who has also been sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment for a new conviction, the backtime and the new sentence must
be served consecutively." In Commonwealth v. Dorian,88 the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court rejected a contention that Section 9761 of
85. Id. at 619-20, 492 A.2d at 683. See also, Casenote, Inpatient Drug Treatment Pro-
grams: Custody or Freedom for Purposes of Pennsylvania's Parole Act?,59 TEMPLE L.Q. 659
(1986).
86. Brunner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 32 Pa. Commw. 483, 373
A.2d 467 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel. Hall v. Board of Probation and Parole, 3 Pa.
Commw. 435 (1971).
87. Commonwealth v. Zuber, 466 Pa. 453, 353 A.2d 441 (1976); Commonwealth v.
Draper, 222 Pa. Super. 26, 293 A.2d 614 (1972).
88. 503 Pa. 116, 468 A.2d 1091 (1983).
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the Sentencing Code89 was inconsistent with Section 21.1(a) of the
Parole Act insofar as mandating consecutive sentences was con-
cerned so that Section 9761 of the Sentencing Code impliedly re-
pealed the inconsistent provisions of Section 21.1(a). The Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court had found that Section 9761 of the Sentencing
Code affected a partial repeal of Section 21.1(a) due to language in
Section 9761 that permits a sentencing court to run a new sentence
concurrently with any other sentence to which a defendant may be
presently subject.90 In reversing that decision, the Supreme Court
opined that the Superior Court's language to that effect was dictum
and specifically disapproved it. The inconsistency that the Superior
Court found between Section 9761 of the Sentencing Code and Sec-
tion 21.1(a) of the Parole Act was implicitly resolved when the Su-
preme Court noted that the Parole Act is a specific piece of legisla-
tion covering the narrow area of parolees who are returned to prison
as convicted violators by the Parole Board. The Sentencing Code, by
contrast, is a general sentencing code designed to cover a variety of
circumstances.9 The law continues to be well-settled that parole vio-
lation backtime and a new sentence must be served consecutively
and a sentencing judge has no power to order the two to run
concurrently.
Section 21.1(a) also prescribes the order in which parole back-
time and new sentences are to be served. The specific provision of
Section 21.1 (a) which deals with the order of the service of sentences
provides:
If a new sentence is imposed upon such parolee, the service of
the balance of said term originally imposed shall precede the
commencement of the new term imposed in the following cases:
(1) If a person is paroled from any State penal or correctional
institution under the control and supervision of the Department
89. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9761 (Purdon 1982). The provision of Section 9761 that
was at issue in Dorian pertained to the order of sentences. That provision, subsection (a),
provides:
(a) Order of service of sentences.-If a minimum sentence imposed by a
court which is to run concurrently with one which has been previously imposed
would expire later than the minimum of such a previously imposed sentence, or
if the previously imposed sentence is terminated before the expiration of the
minimum sentence of the last imposed sentence, the defendant shall be impris-
oned at least until the last imposed minimum sentence has been served.
Id.
90. 314 Pa. Super. 244, 460 A.2d 1121 (1983).
91. See Rivera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 79 Pa. Commw. 558, 470
A.2d 1088 (1984).
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of Justice [now Department of Corrections] and the new sen-
tence imposed upon him is to be served in any such State penal
or correctional institution.
(2) If a person is paroled from a county penal or correctional
institution and the new sentence imposed upon him is to be
served in the same county penal or correctional institution.
In all other cases, the service of the new term for the latter
crime shall precede commencement of the balance of the term
originally imposed.9"
Therefore, under this statutory provision, when a parolee was origi-
nally paroled from a State Correctional Institution (SCI) and the
new sentence is also to be served in a SCI, the parolee serves the
parole backtime first and, when reparoled or service of the maximum
sentence is completed, commences serving the new sentence."3 The
same is true where the parolee was paroled from a county prison and
the new sentence is to be served in the same county prison.94 How-
ever, when a parolee is paroled from a SCI and the new sentence is
to be served in a county prison, or when the parolee is paroled from
a county prison and the new sentence is to be served in a SCI or a
different county prison, the new sentence will be served first. Upon
parole from or completion of that sentence, the parolee will com-
mence serving the backtime imposed by the Parole Board on the
original sentence.95 The order of service of backtime and a new sen-
tence is mandatory and a trial court is without the power or author-
ity to alter the statutory scheme insofar as the order in which the
sentences are served."
2. Technical Parole Violators.-Section 21.1(b) of the Parole
Act 97 deals with technical violators. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has defined a technical violator as a parolee who breaches the
terms and conditions of parole that were imposed by the Parole
Board as a condition of release from prison and which form the
92. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21a(a) (Purdon 1964).
93. Pugh v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 45 Pa. Commw. 41, 404 At2d
776 (1979); Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Super. 118, 191 A.2d 866
(1963).
94. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.2la(a)(2) (Purdon 1964).
95. Carter v. Rapone, 39 Pa. CommW 160, 394 A.2d 1092 (1978); Davis v. Cuyler, 38
Pa. Commw. 488, 394 A.2d 647 (1978).
96. Commonwealth ex rel. Sanders v. Maroney, 202 Pa. Super. 202, 195 A.2d 882
(1964); Commonwealth ex rel. Godfrey, 193 Pa. Super. 344, 165 A.2d 97 (1960), affd, 404
Pa. 401, 171 A.2d 755 (1961).
97. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21a(b) (Purdon 1964).
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terms of the parole contract.98 Section 21.1 (b) empowers the Parole
Board to recommit a parolee who violates those terms and condi-
tions, other than by the commission of a new crime of which the
parolee is convicted in a court of record. In Rivenbark v. Pennsylva-
nia Board of Probation and Parole,99 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court construed that statutory language as withholding from the Pa-
role Board the authority to recommit parolees as technical violators
for a breach of parole conditions when the parolee's conduct which
formed the basis of the breach also formed the basis of a new crimi-
nal conviction. Under Rivenbark, a "technical parole violation" is
restricted to conduct which constitutes a breach of the terms and
conditions of parole but does not also give rise to a new criminal
conviction.
While the Rivenbark decision does prohibit the Parole Board
from recommitting a parolee as a technical and convicted violator
for the same conduct, Rivenbark can not be read to prohibit the Pa-
role Board from recommitting a parolee both as a convicted and a
technical violator when there is independent conduct on the part of
the parolee which does not constitute a new crime of which the pa-
rolee is convicted. For example, a parolee who travels from Philadel-
phia to Allentown to commit a robbery, of which he is subsequently
convicted, may be recommitted as a technical violator for leaving his
parole district without permission even though the robbery convic-
tion precludes the Parole Board from basing a technical violation on
the assaultive behavior which forms part of the robbery conviction.
Thus, while the categories of technical and convicted violator are
mutually exclusive for purposes of conduct giving rise to a new crim-
inal conviction, the Parole Board may still lawfully recommit a pa-
rolee as a technical and as a convicted violator for a course of con-
duct in which only a portion of that conduct gives rise to a new
criminal conviction. 10 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has
since ruled that the holding in Rivenbark be given retrospective
98. Hines v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 142, 146 n.4, 420
A.2d 381, 383 n.4 (1980).
99. 509 Pa. 248, 501 A.2d 1110 (1985).
100. See Pitt v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 97 Pa. Commw. 116, 508
A.2d 1314 (1986) (parolee's arrest in Delaware County which resulted in his conviction for
rape, robbery, theft by unlawful taking and possession of an instrument of crime did not pre-
vent the Parole Board from recommitting the parolee as a technical parole violator for travel-
ing outside of the Philadelphia parole district, which was the district to which he was paroled,
in violation of general parole condition 1, 37 PA. CODE § 63.4(1) (1986). The parolee's leaving
his parole district was not an element of any of the crimes of which he was convicted so it was
properly considered as a technical parole violation.). See also Wile, 1987 Probation and Pa-
role Survey. supra, at 127-28.
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effect.101
3. Revocation Hearings.-The Pennsylvania General Assem-
bly has provided a little guidance in the provisions of the Parole Act
insofar as the actual parole revocation process is concerned. What
little statutory guidance that exists is found in Section 22 of the Pa-
role Act'0 2 and in the Administrative Agency Law.103
(a) Personal appearance before the parole board.-Some of the
statutory provisions in the Parole Act are misleading or obsolete. An
example is Section 22 with its language to the effect that the Parole
Board need not personally see or hear all of the witnesses or evi-
dence. This seems to indicate that the Parole Board can act to re-
voke paroles on the basis of reports submitted by hearing examiners
and parole agents. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
jected this reading of Section 22 in Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau
v. Rundle. 0 " In Rambeau, the Court held that the opinion of the
United States Supreme Court in Morrissey, mandating that a pa-
rolee facing revocation of parole be entitled to have the opportunity
to be heard in person and present witnesses and documentary evi-
dence, 108 required that the parolee be given the opportunity to be
heard personally by the Parole Board.106 The Rambeau holding,
therefore, effectively invalidated that portion of Section 22 which
purported to empower the Parole Board to revoke paroles without
affording the parolee the opportunity to appear before it in person
and present his or her case.
The right to present one's case before the Parole Board does not
entitle the parolee to appear before the entire Parole Board. For-
merly, Section 4 of the Parole Act'07 required that a majority of the
entire membership of the Board is necessary to revoke parole which
101. Brewer v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 96 Pa. Commw. 423, 507
A.2d 934 (1986).
102. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.22 (Purdon 1964). The pertinent part of this statute
reads as follows:
In granting and revoking paroles, and in discharging from parole, the [pa-
role] board acting thereon shall not be required to personally hear or see all the
witnesses and evidence submitted to them for their action, but they may act on a
report submitted to them by their agents and employees, together with any perti-
nent and adequate information furnished to them by fellow members of the
board or by others.
103. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-508 and 701-704 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
104. 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1973), rev'g, Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Board
of Probation and Parole, 4 Pa. Commw. 152 (1972).
105. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
106. Commonwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, 455 Pa. 8, 19-20, 314 A.2d 842, 848
(1973), rev'g, 4 Pa. Commw. 152 (1972).
107. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.4 (Purdon 1964).
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under Rambeau entitled a parolee to appear before a quorum of the
Parole Board in order to satisfy due process requirements. 10 8 The
1986 amendments to this section modify the Rambeau decision since
the Parole Board may now act to revoke paroles in two-person
panels. The Rambeau holding that parolees are entitled to appear
before three members of the Parole Board was based upon former
Section 4's requirement that a majority vote of the entire five-mem-
ber Parole Board was necessary to revoke parole, but now all that is
required is an opportunity for the parolee to appear before the two-
member panel which will make the revocation decision on his parole.
(b) Admissibility of evidence.-The evidentiary portions of Sec-
tion 22, however, were recently given new life by the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court in Jefferson v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole'09 wherein the court cited that section as one of the
bases for admitting a laboratory urinalysis report into evidence at a
parole revocation hearing over the objection of the parolee. In Jeffer-
son, the parolee was charged by the Parole Board with violating gen-
eral condition 5A11 of his parole by using narcotics. The sole evi-
dence submitted by the parole agent in support of the asserted parole
violation was a laboratory urinalysis report that showed that the pa-
rolee's urine sample tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol
("THC"), the active ingredient in marijuana. While the parole agent
could testify as to the circumstances surrounding the taking of the
urine sample from the parolee and the shipment to the Regional
Clinical Laboratories in Erie, Pennsylvania, the agent had no knowl-
edge of the procedures utilized by the Regional Clinical Laborato-
ries, nor did he have any knowledge as to the preparation of the
laboratory report. The laboratory report from the Regional Clinical
Laboratories consisted of a slip of paper with the laboratory name
and a number of chemical substances preprinted on the report. The
parolee's name, parole number, and date of the sample were written
upon the slip, and a control number, corresponding to that assigned
to the urine sample taken from the parolee, was entered on the slip.
108. Pierce v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 46 Pa. Commw. 507, 406
A.2d 1186 (1979).
109. 95 Pa. Commw. 560, 506 A.2d 495 (1986).
110. 37 PA. CODE. § 63.4(5)(i) (1986). This regulation requires that parolees:
"[Aibstain from the unlawful possession or sale of narcotics and dangerous drugs and abstain
from the use of controlled substances within the meaning of The Controlled Substance, Drug,
Device and Cosmetic Act [PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-101 - 780-144 (Purdon Supp. 1986)]
without a valid prescription." Id.
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After the sample was tested, a check mark was placed beside the
preprinted name of each substance for which the sample tested posi-
tive. No other data, except a technician's or supervisor's signature
rubber-stamped upon the document, appeared on the laboratory re-
turn slip. Upon objection by the parolee's counsel, the Parole Board
hearing examiner found good cause to accept the laboratory return
slip based upon the Parole Board's long standing contract with that
particular laboratory and its policy to accept the results from that
laboratory at its revocation hearings.11' Based upon that laboratory
report showing the presence of THC in the parolee's urine and the
agent's testimony concerning how the sample was taken, the Parole
Board recommitted him as a technical parole violator.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court ruled that the language of
Section 22 of the Parole Act evidenced a clear intent by the General
Assembly to broaden the admissibility of evidence at parole revoca-
tion proceedings. While the court duly noted its prior decision in
Grello v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,"' which
held that due process precludes the Parole Board from revoking pa-
role solely upon hearsay evidence, the court reasoned that by virtue
of Section 22 the laboratory slip did not constitute inadmissible
hearsay. In reviewing the statutory language of the second para-
graph of Section 22, the court ruled that the-General Assembly in-
tended to allow the Parole Board to rely upon laboratory reports
from an entity whose reports the Parole Board found reliable in the
past."1
8
The Commonwealth Court's reliance upon Section 22 to permit
the Parole Board to base a parole revocation order upon an uncor-
roborated laboratory return slip seems to be misplaced in light of
prior case law interpreting Section 22 and the use of hearsay evi-
dence in parole revocation proceedings. Section 505 of the Adminis-
trative Agency Law,"" which exempts Commonwealth administra-
tive agencies from adherence to technical rules of evidence, has been
consistently interpreted as not exempting administrative agencies
11l. Jefferson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 95 Pa. Commw. 560, 5.65-
66, 506 A.2d 495, 497-98 (1986).
112. 83 Pa. Commw. 252, 477 A.2d 45 (1984).
113. Jefferson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 95 Pa. Commw. 560, 566,
506 A.2d 495, 498-99 (1986).
114. 2 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon Supp. 1986). This section reads as follows:
§ 505. Evidence and cross-examination
Commonwealth agencies shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence
at agency hearings, and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may
be received. Reasonable examination and cross-examination shall be permitted.
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from the application of the hearsay evidence rule.1 ' Rather, the
hearsay evidence rule has been termed a fundamental rule of law, as
opposed to a technical rule of evidence, and should be applied by
administrative agencies at those points in their proceedings where
facts crucial to the issues are sought to be placed upon the record." 6
B. The Regulatory Framework
Section 23 of the Parole Act 1 7 empowers the Parole Board to
promulgate regulations for the conduct of parolees under its supervi-
sion. The regulations that impose the specific conditions of parole are
found in Chapter 63 of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code." 8 The
general conditions of parole, applicable to all parolees, are found at
Section 63.4."1
115. State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Contakos, 21 Pa. Commw.
422, 346 A.2d 850 (1975); Bleilevens v. State Civil Service Commission, II Pa. Commw. 1,
312, A.2d 109 (1973). Contra Lucas v. Department of Environmental Resources, 53 Pa.
Commw. 598, 420 A.2d I (1980) (agency hearing examiner is not strictly bound by hearsay
rule).
116. State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v. Contakos, 21 Pa. Commw.
422, 424-25, 346 A.2d 852; Bleilevens v. State Civil Service Commission, II Pa. Commw. 1, 4,
312 A.2d 109, Il (1973).
117. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.23 (Purdon 1964). Additional rulemaking authority
for the Parole Board is found in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 186 (Purdon 1962).
118. 37 PA. CODE 99 63.1-63.8 (1986).
119. 37 PA. CODE § 63.4 (1986). This provision reads as follows:
§ 63.4. General conditions of parole.
If parole is granted, the parolee shall be subject to the following conditions:
(1) Report in person or in writing within 48 hours [following release from
prison] to the district office or suboffice specified by the [Parole] Board and not
leave that district without prior written permission of the parole supervision
staff.
(2) Live at the residence approved by the Board at release and not change
residence without the written permission of the parole supervision staff.
(3) Maintain regular contact with the parole supervision staff by:
(i) Reporting regularly as instructed and following any written in-
structions of the Board or the parole supervision staff.
(ii) Notifying the parole supervision staff within 72 hours of any
arrest.
(iii) Notifying the parole supervision staff within 72 hours of any
change in status including but not limited to employment, on the job
training, and education.
(4) Comply with all municipal, county, State, and Federal criminal laws, as
well as the Vehicle Code and the Liquor Code (PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, §§ 1-101
- 9-902 (Purdon 1969)).
(5) Additionally:
(i) Abstain from the unlawful possession or sale of narcotics and
dangerous drugs and abstain from the use of controlled substances within
the meaning of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic
Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 780-101 - 780-144 (Purdon 1977) without
a valid prescription.
(ii) Refrain from owning or possessing any firearms or other
weapons.
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The regulatory framework for the parole revocation process is
found in Chapters 71120 and 75121 of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania
Code. Chapter 71 provides the procedure for the arrest of parole vio-
lators and conducting parole revocation hearings. Chapter 75 lists
the presumptive ranges for backtime122 which the Parole Board may
impose for various parole violations.
The Parole Board's regulations establish two separate proce-
dures to determine the validity of asserted parole violations. This di-
chotomy mirrors the statutory distinction found in Section 21.1 of
the Parole Act between technical and convicted violators. Sections
71.1 and 71.2 of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code apply when the
violation of parole asserted is a breach of the conditions of parole
other than the parolee's arrest or conviction for a new criminal of-
fense. Sections 71.3 and 71.4 pertain where the only asserted parole
violation is arrest or conviction for a new criminal offense. Section
71.5 is a general procedure section that is applicable to procedures
involving both technical and convicted violators.
1. Technical Violations.-By their own terms, Sections 71.1
and 71.2 pertain only to those situations where the only violation of
parole charged is a breach of the specific conditions of parole other
than arrest or conviction for a new criminal offense.
The parole agent is the initiating authority for technical parole
violations. When the agent has reason to believe that a parolee has
violated the conditions of parole, he may apply to his district supervi-
sor for permission to arrest the parolee.1 23 When the agent is unable
to contact the district supervisor or when the agent feels that the
immediate confinement of the parolee is imperative, the agent is au-
thorized to have the parolee arrested and detained for up to forty-
eight hours.1 24 If the agent utilizes such a forty-eight hour detention,
he is required to apply, as quickly as possible, to his district supervi-
(iii) Refrain from any assaultive behavior.
120. 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.1-71.5 (1986).
121. 37 PA. CODE §§ 75.1-75.4 (1986).
122. "Backtime" in the context of a parole violation has been judicially-defined as:
[T]hat part of an existing judicially-imposed sentence which the Board di-
rects a parolee to complete following a finding after a civil administrative hear-
ing that the parolee violated the terms and conditions of parole, which time must
be served before the parolee may again be eligible to be considered for a grant of
parole.
Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 38, 43, 483 A.2d
1044, 1047 (1984) (emphasis in original). See also Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 253 n.4, 501 A.2d I110, 1113 n.4 (1985).
123. 37 PA. CODE § 71.1(a) (1984).
124. 37 PA. CODE § 71.1(d) (1984).
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sor for a "Warrant to Commit and Retain," which is a Parole Board
document issued to arrest and hold a suspected parole violator.125
Within forty-eight hours of his arrest for asserted technical pa-
role violations, the parolee is informed both orally and in writing 1)
of the charges against him; 2) that a probable cause hearing will be
held within fifteen days; 3) that he has a right to speak at that hear-
ing and have voluntary witnesses appear on his behalf; 4) that he
may present evidence by affidavit; 5) that he may retain counsel and
he is provided with the address of the appropriate public defender; 6)
that he may request the presence of witnesses upon whose testimony
the parole violations are to be based; and 7) that the purpose of the
hearing will be to determine whether probable cause exists to believe
that he committed a parole violation. 26
Preliminary hearings are conducted by Parole Board hearing ex-
aminers, and the parolee has a right to be present throughout the
hearing. At the time of the preliminary hearing, the parolee has the
option of waiving that hearing with the showing of probable cause
for a final violation hearing 2 7 if the parolee is willing to waive his
right to appear before a quorum, now panel, of the Parole Board. 2 8
Parole Board representatives who are familiar with the facts upon
which the asserted parole violations are based are required to be pre-
sent at the preliminary hearing to testify; other witnesses need be
present only if specifically requested, in advance, by the parolee.2
Upon the completion of the hearing, the hearing examiner submits a
written report to the Parole Board summarizing the evidence
presented and stating whether any of the asserted parole violations
are supported by probable cause. 130
A violation hearing will be scheduled within 120 days of the
preliminary hearing if probable cause is found to support the as-
serted parole violations.'' The Parole Board is required to furnish
125. Id.
126. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(1) (1986).
127. In its regulations, the Parole Board terms the second-level hearing dealing with
technical parole violations a "violation hearing" while the second-level hearing dealing with
new criminal convictions is termed a "revocation hearing." See 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.2(9),
71.2(11), 71.2(14), 71.4(l), 71.4(3), 71.4(5), 71.5(d) (1986). The two hearings are mutually
exclusive so that where a parolee is charged both with a new conviction and technical parole
violations, he is given both a violation hearing and a revocation hearing.
128. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(4)(iv) (1981).
129. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(6) (1981).
130. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(7) (1981).
131. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(11) (1983). Where the Parole Board fails to schedule a viola-
tion hearing within 120 days of the preliminary hearing, and none of the delay is attributable
to the parolee or his counsel, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has ruled that such a
delay constitutes a per se denial of due process entitling the parolee to a dismissal with
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both the parolee and counsel with written notice of the scheduled
time and place of the violation hearing. In addition to the informa-
tion provided in the notice of the preliminary hearing, the violation
hearing notice must apprise the parolee of his right to a hearing
before a quorum of the Parole Board; to the assistance of counsel
and the availability of free counsel if indigent; to cross-examine and
confront adverse witnesses unless good cause is specifically found to
deny confrontation and cross-examination; and that the parolee has a
right to speak and present voluntary witnesses on his own behalf and
present evidence by affidavit or otherwise."'2 Technical parole viola-
tions must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 133
Where the violation hearing is held before a Parole Board Hear-
ing Examiner, rather than before a quorum of the Parole Board, the
examiner is required to file a written report which states: 1) the as-
serted parole violations that have been proven by a preponderance of
the evidence and the asserted parole violations that have not been
proven; 2) the evidence relied upon; and 3) the examiner's recom-
mendation as to the disposition of the parole violations and the rea-
sons for the recommendation.184
The role of the examiner in Parole Board revocation proceed-
ings differs from that of a referee in workmen's compensation and
unemployment compensation matters in that the Parole Board exam-
iner is not a fact-finder and makes only recommendations which the
Parole Board is free to adopt or disregard. Unlike his workmen's
compensation and unemployment compensation counterparts, the
Parole Board examiner is not empowered to make any final deci-
sions. By statute, all decisions relating to parole revocation are re-
served to the Parole Board.
The Parole Board is required by its own regulations to act
promptly upon the examiner's report unless the parolee, or counsel,
requests a delay so that a statement in opposition to parole revoca-
tion may be submitted on the parolee's behalf. That statement must
be submitted to the Parole Board within seven days of the hearing
before the examiner. 185 The Parole Board then has the entire record
before it and is empowered to make its own credibility determina-
prejudice of the technical parole violation charges. Capers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole, 42 Pa. Commw. 356, 400 A.2d 922 (1979) (en banc).
132. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(12) and 71.2(13) (1983).
133. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(20) (1983); Hossback v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 80 Pa. Commw. 344, 471 A.2d 186 (1984).
134. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(17) (1983).
135. 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(18) (1983).
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tions based upon its own review of that record.
2. Conviction for a New Criminal Offense.-Sections 71.3 and
71.4 of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code s" relate specifically to
those cases where the only parole violation is the arrest and convic-
tion of a new criminal offense. Section 71.3 deals with the situation
where a parolee is arrested and charged with a new criminal offense.
Section 71.4 pertains to the procedure where the parolee is convicted
of the new criminal offense, either following trial or by pleading
guilty or nolo contendere.
(a) Arrest for a new criminal offense.-The detention of a pa-
rolee by the Parole Board for a new crime is independent of the pa-
rolee's new criminal proceeding as well as any technical violations
that the Parole Board may have asserted against the parolee. When
a parolee is arrested and charged with a new crime, he may be de-
tained on the basis of that new charge by a Parole Board warrant
only after 1) a prima facie case has been made out at a criminal
preliminary hearing; 2) the parolee waives that hearing; 3) the pa-
rolee is convicted of a crime in Philadelphia Municipal Court or
before a District Justice; or 4) a "Detention Hearing" is conducted
by the Parole Board."s' A "Detention Hearing" is simply an inde-
pendent probable cause hearing, the convicted violator counterpart
to a preliminary hearing, conducted by the Parole Board to deter-
mine whether probable cause exists to believe that the parolee has
violated parole and should be detained pending the disposition of the
new criminal charges.1 8 In any event, the parolee must be provided
with or waive a criminal preliminary hearing or a Parole Board De-
tention Hearing within thirty days of his initial detention by the
Board.139
It is entirely possible for the parolee to post bail yet remain in
custody due to the Board's warrant and detainer. 40 Where a parolee
does post bail on the new charges but remains incarcerated solely
due to the parole warrant and detainer, the Parole Board is required
to credit the original sentence with the time the parolee spent so
incarcerated regardless of the eventual outcome of the new criminal
136. 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.3 and 71.4 (1986).
137. 37 PA. CODE § 71.3(l) (1986).
138. Reale v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 99 Pa. Commw. 16, 18 n.5,
512 A.2d 1307, 1308 n.5 (1986).
139. 37 PA. CODE § 71.3(9) (1986).
140. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 291, 420
A.2d 1324 (1980); Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412
A.2d 568 (1980).
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prosecution.14 1
In evaluating whether a parolee who has been arrested for a
new criminal offense should be further detained, the Parole Board
takes into consideration a number of factors including the serious-
ness of the new offense, the risk to the community if the parolee is
released, the supervision history while on parole, the possibility of
the parolee absconding, and involvement of a firearm or assaultive
behavior in the new criminal charge.'42 Once a decision has been
made to detain the parolee, no further hearings need be held until
the criminal charges are disposed. While the regulations do require
the Parole Board to conduct a monthly review of the status of the
criminal charges, that monthly review does not entitle the parolee to
a new Detention Hearing for each month the parolee is detained. 4 a
(b) Revocation hearing following conviction.-Once the parolee
has been convicted, either by a finding of guilt by a judge or jury or
by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the Parole Board is required
to hold a due process hearing for the parolee prior to making a deci-
sion whether or not to revoke parole and recommit the parolee to
prison. The Parole Board's administrative regulations term this type
of second-level Morrissey hearing a "revocation hearing.
The purpose of the revocation hearing is to allow the Parole
Board to determine whether the parolee should be recommitted to
prison and have parole revoked because of the new criminal convic-
tion."1 5 There are two distinct phases to the revocation hearing. The
first phase is when the parole agent provides proof that the parolee
has been convicted of a crime committed while on parole. The parole
agent easily accomplishes this task by introducing into evidence cop-
ies of criminal court docket sheets showing that the parolee has been
convicted of a crime and indicating the date of the offense to show
that it was committed while the parolee was on parole.' 40 The fact
141. Hines v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 142, 420 A.2d 381
(1980); Campbell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 48 Pa. Commw. 454, 409
A.2d 980 (1980) (where bail is not posted, confinement time is properly credited against the
new sentence and not against the original sentence).
142. See 37 PA. CODE § 71.3(10) (1986).
143. 37 PA. CODE § 71.3(11) (1986).
144. 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.4(I)(iii),(2),(3)(i),(5) (1980).
145. 37 PA. CODE § 71.4(1)(i) (1980).
146. 37 PA. CODE § 71.5(d) (1986) authorizes the Parole Board to rely solely upon
documentary evidence and reports provided the Parole Board is satisfied as to their authentic-
ity, relevancy, and accuracy. See also Anderson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role, 91 Pa. Commw. 486, 497 A.2d 947 (1985); Davis v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 85 Pa. Commw. 481 A.2d 714 (1984).
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that the parolee may have appealed the new conviction is irrelevant
insofar as the Parole Board's proceedings are concerned. " 7
The second, and more important phase of the revocation hearing
is when the parolee is given the opportunity to convince the Parole
Board that parole remains a viable rehabilitative tool and that the
parolee remains a good parole risk. 148 Once the parole agent has es-
tablished the fact that the parolee has sustained a new conviction for
a crime committed while on parole, a presumption is raised that pa-
role is no longer a viable tool for rehabilitation. " 9 It is then incum-
bent upon the parolee to rebut that resumption with positive evi-
dence that may mitigate or justify the new conviction and show that
the parolee is able to function as a contributing, law-abiding member
of society. The reported decisions emanating from Pennsylvania ap-
pellate courts indicate the judiciary considers this the primary pur-
pose of the revocation hearing since the fact of the new conviction is
a matter of public record." 0
The parolee is also entitled to have the revocation hearing held
within a reasonably prompt period of time following conviction. By
regulation, the Parole Board is required to provide the parolee with a
revocation hearing within 120 days of being officially notified that a
new conviction has occurred. 15' However, unlike the 120 day time
limit for violation hearings, the period within which the Parole
Board must provide a parolee with a revocation hearing does not
commence until the parolee enters an institution under the jurisdic-
tion of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections or waives the
right to appear personally before a quorum of the Parole Board.'52
147. Terrell v. Jacobs, 37 Pa. Commw. 493, 390 A.2d 1379 (1978). Cf. Commonwealth
v. Shaw, 280 Pa. Super. 575, 421 A.2d 1081 (fact that guilty plea was under collateral attack
did not render parole revocation order illegal in that a valid guilty plea existed at the time of
the parole revocation hearing).
148. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973); O'Hara v. Pennsylva-
nia Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985); Simmons v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 74 Pa. Commw. 283, 459 A.2d 897 (1983).
149. Harper v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. -,
520 A.2d 518 (1987); Pickert v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 100 Pa.
Commw. 44, 514 A.2d 252 (1986) (Barbieri, J., concurring).
150. O'Hara v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 371,
487 A.2d 90, 98 (1985).
151. 37 PA. CODE § 71.4(2) (1980); Woods v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 79 Pa. Commw. 134, 469 A.2d 332 (1983).
152. 37 PA. CODE § 71.4(2)(i) (1980); Blair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 78 Pa. Commw. 41, 467 A.2d 71 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984) (time spent
by parolee in county prison excluded in timeliness calculation); Auman v. Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole, 38 Pa. Commw. 621, 394 A.2d 686 (1978) (time spent by parolee in
out-of-state prison excluded in timeliness calculation); Harris v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 38 Pa. Commw. 391, 393 A.2d 510 (1978) (time spent by parolee in federal
penitentiary excluded in timeliness calculation).
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This precondition does not apply, however, where the parolee is con-
fined in a county prison, outside of the jurisdiction of the Depart-
ment of Corrections, solely on account of the Parole Board's warrant
and detainer. In those cases, the 120 day period commences when
the Parole Board receives official notification of the conviction.15
With the elimination of the "full board" type of revocation hearings
by Act 134,154 this exclusion may become less important once the
Parole Board amends its regulations to reflect the statutory changes.
The triggering event that commences the regulatory time period
is the conviction for a new criminal offense based upon a verdict or a
plea of guilty. This issue was resolved in the case of United States ex
rel. Burgess v. Lindsey.155 In a civil rights action under Section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,56 Walter Burgess was recommitted
by the Parole Board as a convicted parole violator following his con-
viction on May 23, 1973, of robbery and related offenses. The Parole
Board, in accordance with its prior practice, delayed Burgess' revo-
cation hearing until after he was sentenced in Montgomery County
Common Pleas Court on December 31, 1973. This policy of delaying
the scheduling of the revocation hearing until after the imposition of
sentence was based upon a Pennsylvania Superior Court decision 1
7
holding that the term "conviction" included sentencing following the
finding of guilt. In Burgess' case, the nine month delay from convic-
tion to revocation hearing on February 7, 1974, was typical of the
effect of the Parole Board's policy. In rejecting the "highly techni-
cal" definition of "conviction" relied upon by the Parole Board, the
court reviewed the statutory language of Section 21.1(a) of the Pa-
role Act' 58 and concluded that a verdict or plea of guilty "provides
the [Parole] Board with all the information it needs to begin the
parole revocation process, for it establishes the fact of a parole viola-
tion."'1 9 Therefore, the Parole Board was required to provide a con-
victed parole violator with a revocation hearing within a reasonable
time after the parolee's guilt was established. 160 A subsequent un-
published order in Burgess became the basis for the Parole Board's
153. Dobson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 41 Pa. Commw. 27, 398
A.2d 252 (1979); Taylor v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 40 Pa. Commw. 454,
397 A.2d 849 (1979).
154. See 1986 PA. LEGIS. SERV. No. 7, at 18-19 (Purdon).
155. 395 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. Iii 1979).
157. Commonwealth v. Greer, 215 Pa. Super. 66, 257 A.2d 317 (1969).
158. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21a(a) (Purdon 1964).
159. 395 F. Supp. 404, 411 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
160. Id.
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regulation establishing the 120 day time period, which is codified at
Section 71.4(2) of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania Code.' 61
3. Presumptive Ranges for Backtime.-Once the Parole
Board has determined, following a timely violation or revocation
hearing, that a parolee has violated parole, Section 21.1 of the Pa-
role Act authorizes the Parole Board to return the parole violator to
prison to serve the entire remaining balance of the original sentence.
Section 21.1 also empowers the Parole Board to reparole both tech-
nical and convicted parole violators when it would be in their best
interest and the interests of the Commonwealth would not be
injured.
The grant of discretion to the Parole Board whether to reparole
a parole violator is complete; however, the Parole Board adopted a
series of presumptive ranges in 1979 which structured its discretion
in mandating the time to be served in prison before consideration for
reparole. As noted earlier in this article, the Parole Board does not
have the authority to alter the original judicially-imposed sentence
from which parole was granted. 62 Therefore, the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court distinguished parole violation "backtime" from a
"sentence" as follows:
A "sentence" has been defined as the judgment formally
pronounced by the court upon a defendant who has been con-
victed in a criminal prosecution which awards the punishment to
the inflicted. [citation omitted]. By comparison, "backtime" is
merely that part of an existing judicially-imposed sentence
which the [Parole] Board directs a parolee to complete following
a finding after a civil administrative hearing that the parolee
violated the terms and conditions of parole, which time must be
served before the parolee may again be eligible to be considered
for a grant of parole.''
Simply put, backtime is that portion of a parolee's unserved sentence
that must be served before he or she can again apply for considera-
tion for parole. The Parole Board promulgated its presumptive range
regulations, codified in Chapter 75 of Title 37 of the Pennsylvania
Code,"' to structure its previously unrestricted discretion to consider
161. See Andrews v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 97 Pa. Commw. 605,
609-10, 510 A.2d 394, 396 (1986).
162. See supra note 79.
163. Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 38, 42-3,
483 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1984) (emphasis in original).
164. 37 PA. CODE §§ 75.1-75.4 (1986).
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parole violators for possible reparole. The presumptive range regula-
tions can be separated into two categories - those dealing with new
convictions and those dealing with technical parole violations.
The regulations dealing with new convictions attempt to list the
various offenses a parolee may be convicted of and assign a backtime
range, in terms of months, to each of those offenses."6 The Parole
Board acknowledges that its listing is not exhaustive and, should a
parolee be convicted of an offense not listed in the regulation, the
Parole Board will utilize the presumptive range assigned to an of-
fense that most closely resembles that of which the parolee was con-
victed.1"' When a parolee is convicted of multiple offenses, the Pa-
role Board has interpreted its regulations as allowing it to impose
backtime for each separate offense and aggregate the backtime in
order to reach a new parole eligibility date.
167
As with new convictions, the regulations dealing with technical
parole violations assign a presumptive range of backtime, in terms of
months, to each general parole condition that may be the subject of
a technical parole violation. 168 Unlike the presumptive ranges for
convictions, however, the technical parole violation regulations do
not allow the Parole Board to aggregate ranges where there are mul-
tiple technical parole violations. Instead, where there are multiple
technical parole violations, the regulations direct that the presump-
tive range of the condition violation having the highest backtime will
be used."'
The regulations do not provide a specific presumptive range for
violations of special parole conditions imposed under Section 23 of
the Parole Act.1 70 The regulations do, however, provide that viola-
tions of special conditions shall be treated at least as severely as the
least serious of the general conditions with backtime allotted to the
violation of a special parole condition aggregated with the backtime
allotted to the violation of general parole conditions to arrive at a
165. See 37 PA. CODE § 75.2 (1986).
166. 37 PA. CODE § 75.1(3) (1986); Harrington v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 96 Pa. Commw. 556, 507 A.2d 1313 (1986) (Parole Board is bound by Pennsylvania
General Assembly's determination of the severity of an offense regardless of the less severe
treatment afforded by the sister state where the subsequent conviction occurred); Moore v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 93 Pa. Commw. 218, 500 A.2d 1286 (1985)
(out-of-state offense analogized to the most similar Pennsylvania offense).
167. Perry v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 548, 485
A.2d 1231 (1984); Corley v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa. Commw.
529, 478 A.2d 145 (1984).
168. 37 PA. CODE § 75.4 (1986).
169. 37 PA. CODE § 75.3(e) (1986).
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.32 (Purdon 1964).
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reparole eligibility date.'
4. Administrative Review of Parole Board Revocation Deci-
sions.-Once parole has been revoked for either technical or crimi-
nal violations, a parolee may have that decision reviewed by the Pa-
role Board. Act 134, the 1986 amendment to the Parole Act,
provides an administrative appeal procedure for parole revocation
decisions. Section 4(d) of the Parole Act 72 allows any interested
party to appeal a Parole Board decision on a parole revocation mat-
ter. This is a departure from the prior administrative appeal proce-
dure provided for under the Parole Board's administrative regula-
tions which allowed only a parolee or his or her counsel the right to
appeal.' Thus, under present law, it is now conceivable for a parole
agent or victim to file an administrative appeal of a Parole Board
decision not to recommit an asserted parole violator. The appeal
must be filed with the Parole Board within thirty days of the date of
the Parole Board order being appealed. The appeal is heard by a
panel of three Parole Board members appointed by the chairman. At
least two out of the three appointed may not have served already on
the panel whose decision is being appealed. Under the statute, the
appeal panel may affirm, reverse, remand, or order the matter heard
de novo. Prior to Act 134, administrative appeals were handled
through the Parole Board's Hearing Review Division. The Division
now handles only matters not covered within the scope of a statutory
administrative appeal and provides technical assistance and direction
to Parole Board Hearing Examiners. 7
4
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court specifically found that
the Parole Board's Hearing Review Division and the administrative
relief process it offers constitute an adequate and meaningful admin-
istrative remedy which a parolee is required to exhaust prior to seek-
ing judicial review of a Parole Board parole revocation order.'77 The
171. 37 PA. CODE § 75.3(f) (1986); Marsh v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role, 86 Pa. Commw. 482, 485 A.2d 853 (1984).
In Johnson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. -, 527
A.2d 1107 (1987) (en banc), this regulation was construed as assigning a three to eighteen
month presumptive range to violations of special parole conditions.
172. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.4(d) (Purdon 1986).
173. See 37 PA. CODE § 71.5(h) (1986).
174. See 1977-1978 PA. BD. OF PROBATION & PAROLE BIANN. REP. I.
175. St. Clair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 89 Pa. Commw. 561, 493
A.2d 146 (1985); see also Krantz v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa.
Commw. 38, 41 n.3, 483 A.2d 1044, 1045 n.3 (1984); Lantzy v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 82 Pa. Commw. 626, 627 n.2, 477 A.2d 18, 19 n.2 (1984). See generally
Wile, Probation and Parole, 57 PA. B.A.Q. 152, 162 (1986) (hereinafter Wile, Probation and
Parole].
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present adXi.,istrative appeal procedure provides a more meaningful
remedy to parolees as the Parole Board itself is more involved in
reviewing the revocation order being appealed.
C. Judicial Enforcement of Due Process Requirements
If a parolee is still dissatisfied after the Parole Board has ren-
dered a decision on his or her administrative appeal of a parole revo-
cation order, he or she may obtain judicial review of that order.
Pennsylvania appellate courts have taken an active role in enforcing
the minimal due process requirements set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Morrissey. The judiciary has also ensured that
the Parole Board complies with the requirements of its own adminis-
trative regulations pertaining to rights granted parolees in the revo-
cation process. Throughout their oversight of the Parole Board's pa-
role revocation process, Pennsylvania appellate courts have
emphasized that the process is an administrative, not a criminal one,
and have utilized mostly administrative law principles in weighing
the Parole Board's procedures to guarantee they comport with due
process standards.17
1. Notice of Violations and Hearing.-One of the basic due
process rights that the Morrissey Court delineated for parolees is the
right to advance notice of asserted parole violations and disclosure of
the evidence supporting those asserted violations. In administrative
law, the right to notice has two elements - the right to notice of
procedural rights, such as adequate advance notice of the right to a
hearing 177 and adequate notice of the hearing itself and the issues
involved.1 78 The Parole Board's regulations mandate that the Parole
Board apprise the parolee of both elements. The parolee must be
notified of the right to a hearing before a quorum of the Parole
Board, of the right to counsel, and of the right to present witnesses
176. See Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248, 253,
501 A.2d I 110, 1113 (1985); Gundy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa.
Commw. 618, 622, 478 A.2d 139, 141 (1984).
177. Pennsylvania appellate courts have held that where an administrative agency or the
General Assembly has provided a duly published set of procedures for pleadings, hearings, and
appeals, the agency is not required to give additional notice of such rights to parties before it.
See Johnson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. .. 524
A.2d 528 (1987); Fusaro v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 34 Pa. Commw. 14, 382
A.2d 794 (1978); Commonwealth v. Derry Township, 10 Pa. Commw. 619, 314 A.2d 868
(1973), vacated on other grounds, 466 Pa. 31, 351 A.2d 606 (1976).
178. See. e.g., Clark v. Department of Public Welfare, 58 Pa. Commw. 142, 427 A.2d
712 (1981).
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and evidence in his own behalf and confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses. The regulations also require that the parolee be noti-
fied of the asserted parole violations, the circumstances of the as-
serted violation, and the date of the parole violation hearing.1 79 The
regulations mandate that this notice will be given to the parolee both
orally and in writing. 180 The Parole Board has adopted a form, desig-
nated the PBPP-340, entitled "Notice of Charges and Hearing,"
which notifies the parolee of the asserted parole violations, the sup-
porting evidence, and the time of the parole violation hearing, while
simultaneously informing the parolee of the procedural rights to
which the parolee is entitled.'8
In policing the notice requirement, the reported decisions of
Pennsylvania appellate courts have centered mostly on ensuring that
the parolee receives timely and adequate notice of the asserted pa-
role violations. In Hendrickson v. Pennsylvania State Board of Pa-
role,82 decided nearly a decade prior to Morrissey, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found the Parole Board had given a parolee ade-
quate notice when the parolee was immediately informed of the na-
ture of the asserted parole violations, the Parole Board had evidence
tending to prove those violations, and the parolee had six weeks be-
tween the time he received notice of the asserted violations and the
time he appeared before the Parole Board.
(a) Timing of notice.-In Hendrickson, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that six weeks advance notice of asserted parole
violations was adequate notice to the parolee. The Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court ruled in Simmons v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole'88 that thirty-two days advance notice of as-
serted parole violations was sufficient to satisfy due process. Simi-
larly, in Colon v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,'"
the Commonwealth Court found eight days advance notice was con-
stitutionally sufficient where the parolee articulated no discernible
prejudice stemming from the length of time in which he had to pre-
pare his defense to the parole violation charges.
However, in Murray v. Jacobs,"' the Commonwealth Court
179. 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.2(12) and 71.4(3) (1983).
180. Id.
181. See Coades v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 84 Pa. Commw. 484,
497-98 n.16, 480 A.2d 1298, 1305 n.16 (1984).
182. 409 Pa. 204, 185 A.2d 581 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 817 (1963).
183. 74 Pa. Commw. 283, 459 A.2d 897 (1983).
184. 74 Pa. Commw. 431, 456 A.2d 1145 (1983).
185. __ Pa. Commw. -, 512 A.2d 785 (1986).
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held that a weekend's notice is inadequate to satisfy due process. In
Murray, the parolee, Wendell Murray, was charged with violating
parole by stealing a pack of cigarettes and subsequently being con-
victed of retail theft. He was originally scheduled for a parole Revo-
cation Hearing at SCI-Camp Hill on June 17, 1985. That hearing
was postponed at the insistence of a Parole Board Hearing Examiner
after the examiner learned Murray was in the prison clinic diag-
nosed as having pre-Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS). On Friday, August 23, 1985, the Parole Board notified
Murray and his counsel of a parole revocation hearing scheduled for
Monday, August 26, 1985. As a result of the short notice, the assis-
tant public defender was unable to rearrange his schedule in order to
attend the Monday hearing. At the hearing Murray was cajoled by
the hearing examiner to waive counsel in the face of having his hear-
ing again postponed indefinitely. Following the hearing, the Parole
Board revoked his parole.
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court held that two days ad-
vance notice over a weekend does not constitute adequate notice suf-
ficient to comply with due process. While there was no allegation
that Murray's counsel was not prepared to present a defense on such
notice, the court noted that counsel was unable to attend the hearing
on such short notice. This inadequate notice was not cured by Mur-
ray's failure to request a continuance of the hearing since the Parole
Board placed him in the untenable position of having to choose be-
tween waiving either his right to counsel or his right to a speedy
hearing. 8 Since Murray's hearing had been previously postponed by
the Parole Board, the notice was constitutionally inadequate.
The court did distinguish the factual situation in Murray from
that present in Hill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role.187 In Hill, the Parole Board also provided Charles Hill with
only two days' notice of his parole Revocation Hearing. Like Mur-
ray, Hill did not have counsel present to represent him at the hear-
ing and further stated that he felt two days was an inadequate time
in which he could prepare his defense. 188 The hearing examiner of-
fered Hill a continuance of the revocation hearing to procure the
presence of counsel and allow time to prepare an adequate defense.
Hill refused the offered continuance, stating only that he wanted the
186. Id. at -, 512 A.2d at 790.
187. 89 Pa. Commw. 140, 492 A.2d 80 (1985), allowance to appeal denied, - Pa.
-, 524 A.2d 496 (1987).
188. Id. at 147, 492 A.2d at 84.
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fact of two days' notice on the record to serve as the basis for a
possible appeal. On those facts, the Commonwealth Court found that
Hill knowingly and intelligently waived his right to advance notice of
his revocation hearing, in effect, curing the alleged defective
notice.18 9
(b) Required content of notice.-In addition to being timely, the
notice must also adequately inform the parolee of the specific condi-
tions of parole the Parole Board asserts were violated and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the asserted violations. The test for deter-
mining the sufficiency of notice is one of reasonableness in relation to
the facts. In other words, does the notice reasonably inform the pa-
rolee of the matter to be dealt with at the hearing and provide
enough information to enable the parolee to prepare his case? 90
There can be no question that the Parole Board violates a pa-
rolee's due process rights when it hears evidence on an asserted pa-
role violation of which the parolee was not notified. In Champion v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,"9' the parolee, Donald
Champion, was charged on March 8, 1977 by the Parole Board with
various technical parole violations and new criminal charges. A pa-
role preliminary and detention hearing on the asserted technical pa-
role violations and the new criminal charges was scheduled for
March 17, 1977, but continued at Champion's request until March
31, 1977. On March 31, 1977, Champion waived his preliminary
and detention hearing so that the hearing could be considered as the
second-level violation hearing. At that time, he informed the Parole
Board hearing examiner that he had been convicted of the new crim-
inal charges the previous day. The hearing examiner thereupon held
a revocation hearing regarding the asserted technical parole viola-
tions. The Parole Board conceded that there was no advance notice
to Champion informing him that his conviction would be the basis of
a parole revocation hearing on March 31, 1977.192
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court reversed the
Parole Board's revocation order and remanded the case for a new
hearing with proper notice. The court rejected the Parole Board's
argument that formal advance notice of the criminal conviction was
189. Id. at 147-48, 492 A.2d at 84. But see Commonwealth v. Spence, 252 Pa. Super.
341, 381 A.2d 949 (1977) (issue of right to written notice of asserted parole violations not
waived by parolee's failure to raise the issue of lack of notice at the revocation hearing).
190. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, § 97 (1976).
191. 41 Pa. Commw. 350, 399 A.2d 447 (1979).
192. Id. at 352-53, 399 A.2d at 448.
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unnecessary since Champion was already aware of that conviction.
The pertinent inquiry is whether Champion was aware that a revoca-
tion hearing on the basis of a new criminal conviction would be held
on March 31, 1977. The court concluded that the Parole Board had
violated its own regulations19" as well as the minimum due process
requirements set forth in Morrissey when it proceeded to revoke
Champion's parole on the basis of the conviction despite the fact that
Champion had no prior notice that the conviction would be consid-
ered at that hearing.194
While the Parole Board may not use conduct or asserted viola-
tions of which the parolee has no prior notice of when it determines
whether the parolee violated parole, the Commonwealth Court has
permitted the Parole Board to consider such conduct to determine
whether parole should be revoked once the asserted parole violations
of which the parolee is aware have been proven. In Washington v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,1 95 the Commonwealth
Court held that the Parole Board did not violate the parolee's due
process rights where it considered the parolee's summary conviction,
which was not included in the notice of parole violation charges, in
determining whether he should be recommitted to prison as a parole
violator. In that case, the Parole Board asserted that the parolee,
Mark Washington, violated his parole by possessing a weapon and
engaging in assaultive behavior. In support of those asserted parole
violations, the Parole Board noted the following on its form PBPP-
340, Notice of Charges and Hearing:
On 2/12/82 you had in your possession a dangerous/offen-
sive weapon (knife). A Violation of Condition #5B.
On 2/12/82 you allegedly stabbed Jonas Hampton inside
the Princes' Tavern, 225 High St., Phoenixville, Pa. A Violation
of Condition #5C. "
During Washington's parole violation hearing, his parole agent
testified that he pleaded guilty to the summary offense of harass-
ment. The Parole Board found that he violated his parole by engag-
ing in assaultive behavior and recommitted him to prison. The Court
held that the Parole Board could properly consider Washington's
summary conviction for harassment to determine whether or not his
parole should be revoked as a result of the proven parole violation of
193. 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.2, 71.4 (1983).
194. 41 Pa. Commw. 350, 353, 399 A.2d 447, 448 (1979).
195. 73 Pa. Commw. 432, 458 A.2d 645 (1983).
196. Id. at 434, 458 A.2d at 646.
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assaultive behavior. The Parole Board could not use the conviction to
establish a violation of parole when it failed to provide to the parolee
an amended notice stating its intention to use the conviction for that
purpose.197 Since the Parole Board used the conviction only to deter-
mine the penalty it should impose upon Washington as a result of
the technical parole violation, its consideration of the conviction was
proper.
In addition to informing the parolee of the specific parole viola-
tions asserted by the Parole Board and the basis for those violations,
the parolee is also entitled to be informed of the date, time, and
place of the parole revocation hearing. In McCloud v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole,198 the Parole Board informed the
parolee, Artie McCloud, that a parole violation hearing would be
held regarding asserted technical parole violations. Although the no-
tice McCloud received specified the asserted violations and their ba-
ses, the notice failed to include the date, time, or place of the sched-
uled violation hearing. As a result, McCloud, who was incarcerated
and had no trouble being summoned for a parole hearing, appeared
at the Violation Hearing without counsel. He was represented by
counsel at his earlier preliminary hearing and argued that his attor-
ney was not present because the notice of the parole violations in-
cluded no date for the scheduled hearing. On appeal, the Common-
wealth Court rejected the Parole Board's argument that McCloud or
his attorney had the obligation to inquire of the Parole Board to as-
certain when the violation hearing was scheduled. Instead, the obli-
gation is upon the Parole Board to provide the parolee with notice of
its proceedings.199 The court denied McCloud a new hearing on the
technical parole violations since the Parole Board had subsequently
provided him with a new hearing in conjunction with a new criminal
conviction that he sustained. Although the court noted that
McCloud's right to a new hearing would otherwise be clear, the Pa-
role Board had already provided him with the relief he sought.2"'
The important test of the requirement of notice is whether it
adequately and timely informs the parolee of the charges against
which he must defend and when and where he must present that
defense. In reviewing the adequacy of the notice provided in parole
violation proceedings, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has
197. Id. at 437, 458 A.2d at 648.
198. 47 Pa. Commw. 208, 407 A.2d 484 (1979).
199. Id. at 210, 407 A.2d at 485.
200. Id.
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consistently held that minor technical defects in the notice are not
fatal. In Hughes v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,0 1
the Commonwealth Court held that the Board's incorrect listing of
the county in which the parolee was alleged to have sustained a new
conviction did not render the notice invalid. The court noted that the
Parole Board documented the parolee's date of arrest and conviction
and informed the parolee that a full Board Revocation Hearing
would be held. That notice was "sufficiently informative" to satisfy
due process since the parolee received enough information to have
received actual notice. The fact that the Parole Board had listed the
parolee's new conviction as taking place in Chester County rather
than Delaware County was not a fatal defect.120
Likewise, the Commonwealth Court has held on numerous occa-
sions that an incorrect Department of Corrections institution num-
ber203 listed on the written notice will not invalidate an otherwise
adequate notice. In Snyder v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole,20" the Commonwealth Court held that the Parole Board's use
of the parolee's incorrect Department of Corrections institution num-
ber on its Notice of Charges and hearing did not invalidate the oth-
erwise adequate notice since the Parole Board had used its own cor-
rect parole number, which covered all sentences to which the parolee
was subject. In Winters v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role,20 6 the Commonwealth Court held that an incorrect institutional
number constituted "harmless error. 2 °6
When enforcing a parolee's right to prior notice of asserted pa-
role violations and the revocation hearing, Pennsylvania appellate
courts have been more concerned with the information contained in
the notices than with the form of the notice itself. As long as the
notice contains sufficient information to inform the parolee of the
asserted conduct at issue, the conditions of parole alleged to have
been violated, and when and where the revocation hearing is to be
201. 81 Pa. Commw. 87, 473 A.2d 225 (1984).
202. Id. at 90-1, 473 A.2d at 227.
203. An institution number is a four-digit number with a letter prefix assigned to a
prisoner by the Department of Corrections during the prisoner's classification upon reception
into the Department's jurisdiction. The institution number relates to a specific sentence to
which the prisoner is subject. When prisoners are constructively paroled from one sentence to
commence service of a consecutive sentence, the Department assigns a new institution number
to the prisoner for that sentence. The letter prefix identifies which of the Department's regional
Diagnostic and Classification Centers assigned the institution number.
204. 78 Pa. Commw. 193, 467 A.2d 112 (1983).
205. 94 Pa. Commw. 236, 503 A.2d 488 (1986).
206. Id. at 250, 503 A.2d at 495. See also Oliver v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole, 89 Pa. Commw. 635, 494 A.2d 10 (1985).
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held, the notice will be considered constitutionally adequate, minor
defects in form notwithstanding.
2. Opportunity to be Heard.-The Pennsylvania judiciary
strictly enforced a parolee's right to appear personally before a quo-
rum of the Parole Board prior to having parole revoked. That right
was first recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Com-
monwealth ex rel. Rambeau v. Rundle, °7 wherein the Supreme
Court construed the Morrissey minimal due process requirement of
providing the parolee the right to be heard in person. The court in-
terpreted the standard as requiring the Parole Board to afford parol-
ees the opportunity to appear in person prior to the decision whether
to revoke parole. Since Section 4 of the Parole Act20 8 requires only a
majority vote of the Parole Board in order to revoke parole, the
Rambeau Court held that it is not necessary for a parolee to appear
before all five members of the Parole Board and that a quorum of
the Parole Board is all that is required to satisfy due process. 09 In
Pierce v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, °10 the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court concluded that the provision of Sec-
tion 4 of the Parole Act authorizing the Parole Board to revoke pa-
roles on a majority vote is not violative of due process. The
Commonwealth Court further concluded that a hearing before three
of the five Parole Board members is all that is constitutionally
required.2 1
Act 134 amended Section 4 of the Parole Act to allow the Pa-
role Board to act on parole revocation matters in two-member
panels. Thus, the right to appear before a quorum of the Parole
Board, set forth in Rambeau, has been statutorily modified by Act
134.212 Since the two-member panels are empowered by statute to
revoke or continue parole, the parolee's right from Morrissey to ap-
pear in person to argue his or her case is preserved.
Under prior law, a parolee could waive the right to appear
before a quorum of the Parole Board. The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court consistently held that a parolee could change his or her
mind at any time prior to the actual hearing and still be entitled to
be heard personally by a quorum of the Parole Board. In LaBoy v.
207. 455 Pa. 8, 314 A.2d 842 (1973).
208. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.4 (Purdon 1964).
209. 455 Pa. 8, 19-20, 314 A.2d 842, 847-48 (1973).
210. 46 Pa. Commw. 507, 406 A.2d 1186 (1979).
211. Id. at 510, 406 A.2d at 1188.
212. 74 Pa. Commw. 332, 459 A.2d 916 (1983).
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Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,"'3 the parolee, Israel
LaBoy, signed a waiver of his right to be heard by a quorum of the
Parole Board on July 7, 1981. When he appeared before a Parole
Board hearing examiner on August 13, 1981, LaBoy claimed to have
expressed a desire to be heard by a quorum of the Parole Board and
objected to having his hearing before the examiner. The court found
that the Parole Board's regulations21 ' expressly permit parolees to
change their minds with respect to the waiving of a hearing before a
quorum of the Parole Board. The regulations provide that when a
parolee who has previously waived such a hearing appears before a
hearing examiner and desires a hearing before a quorum of the Pa-
role Board, the examiner is required to terminate the proceedings
and initiate the scheduling of a hearing before a quorum of the Pa-
role Board, denoted in the regulations as a "full Board hearing."1'
In LaBoy, the record was deficient as to whether the parolee had
actually requested a full Board hearing, and the court remanded the
case to the Parole Board with directions to provide a complete rec-
ord.21 1 In Hartman v. Petsock,1 the Commonwealth Court obtained
a complete record and held that the Parole Board hearing examiner
committed reversible error when he proceeded to take evidence at a
parole violation/revocation hearing after the parolee expressed a de-
sire to have a full Board hearing. In Hartman, the court remanded
the case back to the Parole Board for a new hearing, to be heard
before a quorum of the Parole Board if the parolee so desired.
The right of a parolee to insist upon a full Board Violation or
Revocation Hearing is based upon the plain language of the Parole
Board's own regulations.1 The Commonwealth Court has required
the Parole Board on numerous occasions to comply with its own reg-
ulations insofar as the parole revocation procedure is concerned. 1 9
Once the Parole Board amends its regulations to comport with the
new parole revocation procedure embodied in Act 134, the question
of whether a parolee may insist upon appearing before a quorum of
the Parole Board will become moot.
Just as a parolee can waive the right to a full Board hearing,
213. See 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.2(14)(ii)(B), 71.4(5)(iii) (1983).
214. See, e.g., 37 PA. CODE § 71.4(2)(i) (1980).
215. 74 Pa. Commw. 332, 334, 459 A.2d 916, 917 (1983).
216. Id.
217. 97 Pa. Commw. 311, 509 A.2d 935 (1986).
218. 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.2(14)(ii)(B) and 71.4(5)(iii) (1983).
219. See, e.g., Kunkelman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 40 Pa.
Commw. 149, 396 A.2d 898 (1979); Tate v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 40
Pa. Commw. 4, 396 A.2d 482 (1979).
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the parolee can waive the right to be heard at all. In O'Hara v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,220 the Commonwealth
Court upheld the Parole Board's action in proceeding with a parole
Revocation Hearing in absentia where the parolee refused to partici-
pate. The parolee, Thomas O'Hara, was accused of violating parole
by sustaining several new criminal convictions while on parole. He
had court-appointed counsel to represent him in his Erie County
criminal cases who also initially undertook to represent him in his
parole matter when he had his preliminary hearing in Erie County
Prison. After O'Hara's transfer to the State Correctional Institution
at Pittsburgh (SCI-Pittsburgh), in Allegheny County, his court-ap-
pointed Erie County counsel would no longer represent him.
221
O'Hara insisted upon being represented by his Erie County attorney
and refused to apply for the services of the local public defender.
When his parole hearings were scheduled at SCI-Pittsburgh, he re-
fused to attend or otherwise participate without his Erie County at-
torney. After rescheduling the parole Revocation Hearing five times,
the Parole Board held the hearing in absentia and recommitted
O'Hara as a parole violator. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court
found that O'Hara had waived his right to appear by refusing to
participate in the hearing, despite receiving adequate advance notice.
The Parole Board did not violate O'Hara's due process rights by pro-
ceeding with the sixth scheduled parole hearing after he refused to
attend.22
3. Right of Confrontation and Cross-Examination.-A pa-
rolee's right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses has
been given sporadic protection by Pennsylvania appellate courts. As
noted by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey, the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses is not absolute and
may be denied upon a specific finding of good cause by the Parole
Board or hearing examiner. 223 Additionally, Section 505 of the Ad-
ministrative Agency Law224 mandates that reasonable examination
and cross-examination shall be permitted in proceedings before
220. 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985).
221. Id. at 369 n.15, 487 A.2d at 97 n.15. See also Wile, Right to Counsel, supra note
175, at n.122.
222. Cf. 87 Pa. Commw. at 370, 487 A.2d at 97 (no violation of right to counsel by
Parole Board proceeding with sixth scheduled parole revocation hearing in absentia upon pa-
rolee's refusal to appeal).
223. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
224. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
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Commonwealth agencies.
Both the Morrissey and the Gagnon Courts recognized that pa-
role revocation proceedings are of a more informal nature than ad-
versary criminal trials. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court wrote that
the process should be informal enough to permit consideration of let-
ters, affidavits, and other documents not normally admissible in an
adversary trial. 2 In Gagnon, the Court recognized that certain con-
ventional substitutes for live testimony, such as affidavits and deposi-
tions, are permissible in parole revocation proceedings without violat-
ing principles of due process.22
(a) Hearsay evidence.-Pennsylvania appellate courts have ac-
knowledged that hearsay evidence may be utilized in proceedings
before Commonwealth administrative agencies. In Walker v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review,22 7 the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court attempted to set forth guidelines for the use of
hearsay evidence in such proceedings. The court set forth the follow-
ing guidelines regarding the use of hearsay evidence:
(1) Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not compe-
tent evidence to support a finding of the [Unemployment Com-
pensation] Board [of Review] [citations omitted]; (2) Hearsay
evidence, admitted without objection, will be given its natural
probative effect and may support a finding of the Board, if it is
corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a
finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand.2
2 8
While originally dealing with unemployment compensation law, the
Walker guidelines have been extended to other Commonwealth
229agencies.
In Grello v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,30 the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a Parole Board revo-
cation order based entirely upon hearsay evidence violates due pro-
cess and cannot stand. In Grello, the parolee, John Grello, was
charged with violating three conditions of parole - possessing a fire-
225. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
226. 411 U.S. 778, 782 n.5 (1973). Additionally, the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule is not applicable to parole revocation proceedings. Nickens v. Pennsylvania Board of Pro-
bation and Parole, 93 Pa. Commw. 313, 502 A.2d 277 (1985).
227. 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367 A.2d 366 (1976).
228. Id. at 527, 367 A.2d at 370 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
229. See, e.g., Anderson v. Department of Public Welfare, 79 Pa. Commw. 182, 468
A.2d 1167 (1983).
230. 83 Pa. Commw. 252, 477 A.2d 45 (1984).
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arm, engaging in assaultive behavior, and consuming alcohol. The
evidence Grello's parole agent presented at the parole violation hear-
ing consisted of the affidavit of an Allentown police officer and the
agent's recollection of the testimony of two witnesses who testified at
a criminal preliminary hearing before a District Justice on the al-
leged assaults. Grello's defense counsel timely objected to the intro-
duction of the hearsay but was overruled by the Parole Board hear-
ing examiner. In vacating the Parole Board's revocation order, the
Commonwealth Court specifically adopted the principle that due
process does not permit the revocation of parole based entirely upon
hearsay evidence. 13 In so doing, the court brought the treatment of
hearsay evidence in parole cases within the jurisdiction of the Parole
Board in line with that accorded hearsay evidence by the Pennsylva-
nia Superior Court in probation cases under the jurisdiction of the
common pleas courts.2"2
Although hearsay generally cannot be the sole basis for admin-
istrative action, when an exception to the hearsay rule is applicable
because there are other indicia of its reliability, hearsay may justify
Parole Board action. For example, in Anderson v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole,2 3 and Davis v. Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole,3 " the Commonwealth Court permitted the
use of uncertified copies of criminal court docket sheets as proof of
conviction in parole revocation hearings. In Anderson, the court held
that such documents did not constitute inadmissible hearsay23 5 be-
cause they were "public records" admissible under the Uniform Pho-
tographic Copies of Business and Public Records Act.23 Likewise, in
Whitmore v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,237 the
Commonwealth Court opined that laboratory urinalysis reports could
qualify under the business records exception 8 to the hearsay rule if
the Parole Board provided a proper evidentiary foundation. In Whit-
more, however, the Parole Board failed to lay a proper foundation,
and the report constituted inadmissible hearsay.23 9
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has also recognized
231. Id. at 254, 477 A.2d at 46.
232. See Commonwealth v. Greenlee, 263 Pa. Super. 477, 398 A.2d 676 (1979); Com-
monwealth v. Riley, 253 Pa. Super. 260, 384 A.2d 1333 (1978). See also Wile, Probation and
Parole, supra, at 160.
233. 91 Pa. Commw. 486, 497 A.2d 947 (1985).
234. 85 Pa. Commw. 278, 481 A.2d 714 (1984).
235. 91 Pa. Commw. 486, 491, 497 A.2d 947, 950 (1985).
236. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109 (Purdon 1982).
237. 94 Pa. Commw. 569, 504 A.2d 401 (1986).
238. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108 (Purdon 1982).
239. 94 Pa. Commw. 569, 571, 504 A.2d 401, 402 (1986).
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that evidence otherwise constituting hearsay may be properly admit-
ted under certain circumstances. In Falasco v. Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole,40 the court upheld a Parole Board hearing
examiner's decision to admit into evidence a certified letter sent to
the parolee at his approved address but returned by the United
States Postal Service undelivered and marked "addressee moved, left
no forwarding address." Since the parole agent offered the letter to
show why he undertook an investigation of the parolee's wherea-
bouts, rather than as substantive evidence that the parolee had in-
deed moved from his approved residence in violation of his parole,
the letter did not constitute hearsay and was properly admitted.
(b) "Good cause" findings.-A further exception to the admissi-
bility of hearsay evidence in parole revocation proceedings is the
"good cause" exception. This exception was specifically carved out
by the Morrissey Court as a reason for denying a parolee the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. The applicability of
the good cause exception to the Parole Board's revocation proceed-
ings gives it considerably more leeway in admitting hearsay evidence
than the Walker decision permits other Commonwealth agencies.
Although the Court in Morrissey stated that a parole board
could deny confrontation and cross-examination upon a specific find-
ing of "good cause," the Court did not further define what was
meant by "good cause." There is no reference to "good cause" in the
Parole Act, which predates the Morrissey decision. Additionally, the
regulations promulgated by the Parole Board make no attempt to
define what constitutes "good cause" so as to deny a parolee the
right to confront and cross-examine an adverse witness.
In the absence of any clear or specific guidance, the Pennsylva-
nia Commonwealth Court has held that good cause must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.24' The Commonwealth Court has'
shown a marked aversion to accepting Parole Board policies or per se
rules as "good cause" to accept hearsay evidence. In Grello42 and
Razderk v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,243 the
Commonwealth Court invalidated a Parole Board policy of finding
per se good cause to deny confrontation and cross-examination
whenever a witness was located outside of a fifty mile radius of the
240. - Pa. Commw. -, 521 A.2d 991 (1987).
241. Grello v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa. Commw. 252, 255,
477 A.2d 45, 47 (1983).
242. Id.
243. 76 Pa. Commw. 176, 179 n.4, 463 A.2d Ill, 113 n.4 (1983).
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situs of the parole revocation hearing. In Hracho v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole,4 the Court invalidated a finding of
good cause based upon a Parole Board policy not to subpoena out-of-
state witnesses.2 5
In addition to invalidating set policies of the Parole Board that
find per se good cause, the Commonwealth Court has also been will-
ing to review specific findings of good cause made by the Parole
Board or its hearing examiners. In Tyson v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole,246 the Commonwealth Court invalidated a
hearing examiner's finding of good cause based upon a witness' un-
sworn declaration that she was afraid of the parolee. Similarly, in
Wagner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 47 the court
held that a witness' statement that he was "too busy" to attend the
parole violation hearing did not constitute good cause to admit the
witness' statement over the parolee's objection. In Powell v. Pennsyl-
vania Board of Probation and Parole,248 the Court invalidated a
finding of good cause based upon a hearing examiner's "official no-
tice" of a certain laboratory's state certification and the number of
technicians involved in the testing process because the examiner's
notice was based upon his personal experience in his former position
that is not a subject of proper judicial notice.2 49 However, in Myers
v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,250 the Court upheld
a hearing examiner's finding of good cause based upon the fact that
the author of the New York parole violation report in question was
not within the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth and was therefore
unavailable to the Parole Board.
Thus far, Pennsylvania appellate courts have refrained from es-
tablishing a test for determining the adequacy of good cause findings
in parole revocation proceedings coming before the Parole Board.
The only appellate court to have addressed the issue, the Pennsylva-
244. 94 Pa. Commw. 222, 503 A.2d 112 (1986). Contra Myers v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 97 Pa. Commw. 574, 510 A.2d 387 (1986) (good cause based upon
unavailability of out-of-state official upheld). The distinction between Hracho and Myers can
be explained in terms of the documents sought to be admitted. In Hracho, the parole agent
sought to admit a handwritten statement allegedly made by a North Carolina police officer.
The statement was neither on any official letterhead nor notarized. In contrast, the report in
Myers was an official parole violation report submitted by New York parole authorities to the
Parole Board.
245. 94 Pa. Commw. 222, 225, 503 A.2d 112 ,113 (1986).
246. 84 Pa. Commw. 326, 479 A.2d 52 (1984).
247. 92 Pa. Commw. 132, 498 A.2d 1007 (1985).
248. 100 Pa. Commw. 7, 513 A.2d 1139 (1986), allowance to appeal denied, - Pa.
-, 523 A.2d 346 (1987).
249. Id. at -_ , 513 A.2d at 1142.
250. 97 Pa. Commw. 574, 510 A.2d 387 (1986).
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nia Commonwealth Court, continues to review good cause issues on
a case-by-case basis and is careful not to usurp the fact-finding func-
tion of the Parole Board.251 The only departure the Commonwealth
Court has made thus far from this case-by-case approach is the
court's blanket disapproval of what it terms "arbitrary evidentiary
'policies'" as constituting good cause to deny confrontation and
cross-examination. 5 2 This disapproval of arbitrary policies indicates
a conviction on the part of the Commonwealth Court that the Parole
Board, when making its good cause findings, must balance the com-
peting interests involved - the interest of the parolee in confronting
and cross-examining a witness upon whose testimony his liberty may
be taken away, the interest of the witness in not personally appear-
ing at the parole hearing, and, finally, the interest of the Parole
Board itself in arriving at a reliable and informed decision on the
parole violation matter before it.
(c) Official Notice.-In addition to the "good cause" exception
to the hearsay rule, the Parole Board also has available the doctrine
of official notice. Under the doctrine of official notice, it is permitted
to consider facts and information on a particular parolee that are
contained in its own files without entering the file or its contents into
evidence at a revocation hearing. In Falsaco v. Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole,253 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
expressly held that the doctrine of official notice is applicable to pa-
role revocation proceedings held by the Parole Board. In Falsaco,
the court permitted the Parole Board to consider a summary of ad-
justment contained in a parole violation report prepared by the pa-
rolee's parole agent in determining an appropriate penalty for the
parolee's parole violation. The summary of adjustment is an account
of the parolee's parole history and was objected to as hearsay by
defense counsel. The court held that since the challenged material
was merely a summary of information that was already in the pos-
session of the Parole Board, it could be properly used in determining
the penalty once the Parole Board had established the parole
violation. 54
251. Powell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 100 Pa. Commw. 7, -'
513 A.2d 1139, 1144 (1986), allowance to appeal denied, - Pa. -, 523 A.2d 346
(1987).
252. See Powell, 100 Pa. Commw. 7,, 513 A.2d 1139, 1144 (1986); Grello, 83 Pa.
Commw. 252, 255, 477 A.2d 45, 47 (1983); Razderk, 76 Pa. Commw. 176, 179 n.4, 463 A.2d
III, 113 n.4 (1983).
253. - Pa. Commw. -, 521 A.2d 991 (1987).
254. Id. at -, 521 A.2d at 994-95.
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The official notice doctrine, as adopted by the Commonwealth
Court in Falsaco, allows an administrative agency, such as the Pa-
role Board, to take notice of facts and information contained in the
agency's files as well as those facts that are obvious and notorious to
an expert in the agency's field of expertise."" As noted by the court,
the doctrine of official notice is a much broader concept than the
doctrine of judicial notice, and it allows the Parole Board to take
notice of facts and information that would not be possible for a trial
court to notice at a parole or probation revocation proceeding under
the court's jurisdiction.""
Up to this time, however, the Commonwealth Court has only
approved the Parole Board's use of official notice in the penalty
phase of the parole revocation process. 57 The attempts by the Parole
Board to use official notice in the fact-finding phase have not met
with success. In Abbruzzese v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole,2 " the Commonwealth Court reversed a parole revocation or-
der based upon a hearing examiner's taking official notice of a fact
based upon a parole agent's testimony. Likewise, in Powell v. Penn-
sylvania Board of Probation and Parole,259 the Commonwealth
Court reversed a parole revocation order based upon a good cause
finding by a hearing examiner who took notice of the drug labora-
tory's state certification based upon his personal knowledge rather
than of any information contained in the Parole Board's files. While
the Parole Board's attempts to use official notice in the fact-finding
phase of the parole revocation procedure has not yet met with suc-
cess, there is no reason why the doctrine is not applicable in that
phase if the Parole Board chose to use it in the correct manner.
4. "Neutral and Detached" Hearing Body.-The one minimal
due process requirement set forth in Morrissey that has not received
much judicial attention is the requirement that the parole revocation
hearing be held before a "neutral and detached" hearing body. The
Court commented that such a hearing body need not be comprised of
judicial officers or lawyers and that a "traditional" parole board
255. Id. at -, n.6, 521 A.2d at 994 n.6.
256. See generally 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9771 (Purdon 1982) (revocation of pro-
bation); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 314 (Purdon Supp. 1987) (revocation of parole where maxi-
mum sentence is less than two years); Pa. R. Crim. P. 1409, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
Supp. 1987).
257. Bandy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. -,
- A.2d - (No. 2757 C.D. 1986, filed August 12, 1987).
258. - Pa. Commw. -, 524 A.2d 1049 (1987).
259. 100 Pa. Commw. 7, 513 A.2d 1143 (1986), allowance to appeal denied, - Pa.
-, 523 A.2d 346 (1987).
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would satisfy the requirement. " ' The Pennsylvania procedure,
whereby a majority vote of the Parole Board is required to revoke a
parole and a parolee has a right to personally appear before a quo-
rum of the Parole Board seems to satisfy this requirement of a "neu-
tral and detached" hearing body set forth in Morrissey.
There are several additional factors, however, that cast some
doubt whether the Parole Board, as structured by the Parole Act,
satisfies the Morrissey due process requirement of a "neutral and
detached" hearing body. In addition to making the decision whether
to grant or revoke parole, the Parole Board is also empowered to
supervise parolees while on parole. " 1 The individual parole agents
are employees of, and are ultimately responsible to, the Parole Board
for their performance and actions. Therefore, when a parole agent
presents evidence of an asserted parole violation at a parole revoca-
tion hearing, the agent is presenting that evidence to his or her em-
ployer. Conversely, the Parole Board, when it hears parole revocation
matters, is passing on the sufficiency of evidence gathered by its em-
ployees and agents on its behalf."2 However, while the parole agents
engage in both supervisory and prosecutorial roles, in the parole rev-
ocation process their roles are strictly prosecutorial. The revocation
decision is entirely up to the Parole Board. Other than presenting the
case for parole revocation, the parole agents have no input into the
actual revocation decision. Thus viewed, the Parole Board does keep
the prosecutorial and adjudicative functions separate and would not
seem to impermissibly commingle those functions.
There is virtually no reported case law dealing with what consti-
tutes a "neutral an detached" hearing body for parole revocation
purposes. However, the 1976 decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Hortonville Joint School District No. I v. Hortonville Edu-
cation Association2 63 seems to approve of such a structuring of the
Parole Board. In Hortonville, teachers were dismissed by the local
school board after they had admittedly participated in a strike which
was illegal under Wisconsin law. Before the school board, the teach-
ers argued that the school board, which also conducted the unsuc-
cessful collective bargaining efforts, was not sufficiently impartial to
resolve the issue of their dismissal. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
agreed with the teachers that, since the school board was active in
260. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
261. See generally PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, §§ 331.16b, 331.17, 331.17a, 331.23 (Purdon
Supp. 1986).
262. See. e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.22 (Purdon 1964).
263. 426 U.S. 482 (1976).
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the collective bargaining process, it could not also act as an impartial
hearing body consistent with due process requirements.2" On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the
mere familiarity with the facts of a case gained by an administrative
agency in the performance of its statutory role does not disqualify it
as a decisionmaker.2B6 The Court specifically likened the role of the
school district to the parole board mentioned in Morrissey, since
both have their ultimate plenary authority to make decisions derived
from the state legislature.2" The Court held that the school board
satisfied the due process requirement of an impartial decisionmaker
and specified that due process does not require an independent im-
partial decisionmaker.
The Hortonville decision seems to validate the Parole Board's
role in the parole revocation process despite its statutory role of su-
pervising parolees in addition to making decisions on granting and
revoking paroles. The key validating factor gleaned from the
Hortonville decision is that the Parole Board members do not have a
personal or official stake in the outcome of the parole revocation de-
cision. It is the parole agent who is personally involved in the super-
vision of the parolee and the decision whether to bring parole viola-
tion charges against a particular parolee. Only after parole violation
charges have been initiated by the parole agent or supervisor does
the Parole Board become involved in the revocation process. Conse-
quently, the Parole Board probably retains sufficient detachment to
satisfy the due process requirement of a "neutral and detached"
hearing body set forth in Morrissey.
A problem arises when parole agents are appointed as Parole
Board members. In Blackwell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole,"8 7 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found that
the Parole Board violated a parolee's right to a neutral and detached
hearing body when a Parole Board member refused to recuse himself
from hearing a parole revocation matter in which the same member,
while a parole agent, had written the parole violation report recom-
mending the parolee's recommitment. The Court held that the mem-
ber erred in not recusing himself since a clear conflict of interest
existed because the member participated both in the presentation of
the revocation case as a parole agent and as an adjudicator while a
264. See Hortonville Education Association v. Hortonville Joint School District No. I,
66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975).
265. 426 U.S. 482, 491 (1976).
266. Id.
267. - Pa. Commw. -, 516 A.2d 856 (1986).
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Parole Board member. Such conflicts could be avoided, however, by
paying closer attention to scheduling of revocation cases and as-
signing Parole Board members to revocation panels. The advent of
two-member revocation panels brought about by Act 134 also lessens
the probability of such conflicts arising in future cases.
5. Contents of the Revocation Decision.-The Morrissey
Court specified that the Parole Board's parole revocation decision
must contain a written statement about the evidence it relied upon
and its reasons for revoking parole..26  The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court has often criticized the Parole Board for its "cryptic"
revocation decisions. In Lewis v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole,69 the Commonwealth Court chastised the Parole Board
for its cryptic revocation orders and recommended that it follow a
logical format which specifies the following for each parole violation:
(1) the parole condition number violated, (2) the definition
of that condition, (3) the nature of the parolee's offense, (4) any
applicable presumptive range, (5) any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances considered by the [Parole Board] for increasing
or decreasing recommitment time, and (6) the recommitment
time actually imposed for violation of that condition.
270
A part of the problem with the content and structure of the
Parole Board's parole revocation orders is the exemption the Parole
Board 'enjoys from Section 507 of the Administrative Agency
Law,27' which mandates that adjudications of Commonwealth agen-
cies contain specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. Even
though there is no dispute that the Parole Board is a Commonwealth
agency, the Commonwealth Court has relied upon the definition of
"adjudication" contained in Section 101 of the Administrative
Agency Law27 2 to hold that Parole Board parole revocation orders
are not "adjudications" subject to the requirements of Section
268. 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
269. 74 Pa. Commw. 335, 459 A.2d 1339 (1983).
270. Id. at 337 n.2, 459 A.2d at 1340 n.2.
271. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 507 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
272. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1986). The Administrative Agency
Law's definition of "adjudication" is as follows:
"Adjudication." Any final order, decree, decision or ruling by an agency
affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities or
obligations of any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudica-
tion is made. The term does not include any order based upon a proceeding
before a court or which involves the seizure or forfeiture of property, paroles,
pardons or releases from mental institutions.
Id. (emphasis added).
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507.178 Despite the finding, the Commonwealth Court has empha-
sized to the Parole Board that it must comport with due process re-
quirements concerning the contents of its parole revocation orders.2 4
Unfortunately, those due process requirements noted in Lewis are
quite general and provide the Parole Board with considerable leeway
in the amount of information which it includes in its parole revoca-
tion orders. Past practice of the Parole Board indicates that it in-
tends to keep that information to a minimum.
There is also some question as to the viability of the Common-
wealth Court's conclusion that Parole Board parole revocation orders
are not "adjudications" within the meaning of Section 101 of the
Administrative Agency Law. There is considerable language in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion in Bronson v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole2 75 which seems to indicate that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court considers those orders to be "adjudica-
tions." In Bronson, the court wrote that Sections 701 and 702 of the
Administrative Agency Law27 ' were applicable to the Parole Board's
parole revocation orders and channeled direct appeals from those or-
ders to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. 7 Both Section 701
and 702 deal with direct appeals from "adjudications" of Common-
wealth agencies. The court may have indirectly drawn a distinction
between Parole Board orders dealing with parole applications, to
which no due process rights attach, and those orders dealing with
parole revocations which are subject to certain minimal due process
requirements. With the apparent conflict between Bronson and Da-
vis, the precise status of parole revocation orders under the Adminis-
trative Agency Law is far from clear and some additional guidance
from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is sorely needed.
6. Right to Counsel.-The 1969 Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in Commonwealth v. Tinson,218 entitles parolees to the assis-
tance of counsel to defend against the revocation of their paroles by
the Parole Board and to appointed counsel if indigent. In Coades v.
273. Davis v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 85 Pa. Commw. 278, 481
A.2d 714 (1985). See also LaCamera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 13 Pa.
Commw. 85, 317 A.2d 925 (1974) (en banc) (Parole Board order denying a parole application
not an "adjudication" from which an appeal lies).
274. Davis v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 85 Pa. Commw. 278, 283,
481 A.2d 714, 717 (1984).
275. 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
276. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 701 and 702 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
277. 491 Pa. 549, 558, 421 A.2d 1021, 1025 (1980).
278. 433 Pa. 328, 249 A.2d 549 (1969).
PAROLE REVOCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,279 the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court determined that while a parolee's right to
counsel is absolute, it is based upon statutory rather than constitu-
tional law. The court held that the right to counsel in parole revoca-
tion proceedings is based upon Section 6(a)(10) of the Public De-
fender Act of 1968280 and upon Section 502 of the Administrative
Agency Law. 81 The court then rejected a parolee's claim that the
right to counsel is based upon the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment 82 or upon article I, section 9 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 88
In LaCourt v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,284
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that the parolee's right
to counsel includes the requirement that the assistance provided by
counsel be effective. Parole board proceedings are thus distinguished
from proceedings before other Commonwealth agencies where the
Commonwealth Court specifically declined to extend the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel.28  This right to effective assistance of
counsel does not entitle a parolee to counsel of his or her choice, nor
does it entitle the parolee to the best or most experienced defense
counsel available.2 86 The right only requires that a parolee be pro-
vided with counsel who is competent and who represents the pa-
rolee's best interest in an effective manner. 87
While a parolee enjoys a right to the assistance of counsel in
resisting the revocation of parole, that assistance is limited to that of
a licensed attorney-at-law. In McCain v. Curione,288 the Common-
wealth Court held that a parolee has no right, constitutional or oth-
erwise, to be represented in parole revocation proceedings by a non-
lawyer. The court held that a parolee may represent himself or be
represented by a lawyer. The right of self representation, the court
279. 84 Pa. Commw. 484, 480 A.2d 1298 (1984).
280. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.6(a)(10) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
281. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 502 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
282. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
283. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
284. 87 Pa. Commw. 384, 488 A.2d 70 (1985).
285. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. State Board of Pharmacy, 73 Pa. Commw. 132, 457 A.2d
243 (1983) (disciplinary proceedings before State Board of Pharmacy); Johnson v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board (Bernard S. Pinkus Co.), 14 Pa. Commw. 220, 321 A.2d 728
(1974) (proceeding to set aside final receipt in workmen's compensation case).
286. LaCourt v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 384, 390,
488 A.2d 70, 74-5 (1985).
287. Id. See also Vereen v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 101 Pa.
Commw. 63, 515 A.2d 637 (1986).
288. __ Pa. Commw. -, 527 A.2d 591 527 A.2d 591 (1987).
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held, may not be delegated to a lay person.289
(a) Obtaining counsel.-Other than privately retaining counsel,
a parolee is entitled to the services of the public defender if he or she
lacks available financial resources to hire private counsel. Section
6(a)(10) of the Public Defender Act290 specifically places upon the
various county public defender's offices an obligation to defend indi-
gent parolees faced with the revocation of their paroles.
The mere fact that the Public Defender Act required public de-
fenders to represent indigent parolees did not ensure that parolees
were in fact receiving counsel for their hearings before the Parole
Board. The fact that parolees were normally held in state correc-
tional institutions outside of the county in which they were sentenced
often led to the jurisdictional problem of deciding which public de-
fender's office was obligated to provide counsel to indigent parolees.
Quite often a parolee was incarcerated in a state correctional institu-
tion located in a county a considerable distance from the county
which imposed the sentence from which the parolee was paroled.
This jurisdictional question was settled in 1981 in the case of Pas-
saro v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole2 91 The Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court designated the public defender of the
county of the parolee's incarceration, as opposed to the public de-
fender of the parolee's sentencing county, as the office to supply legal
representation to indigent parolees requesting legal representation in
their proceedings before the Parole Board. In choosing the incarcera-
tion situs public defendant to shoulder the burden of representing
indigent parolees, the court reasoned that
[I]t is patently absurd, for whatever reason, to require de-
fense counsel to travel the length and breadth of this Common-
wealth, to necessitate the transportation of parolees and the at-
tendant security problems, and to incur wholly unnecessary
expenses in time and money when those same interests can be
served by the incarceration site's public defender. 92
In order to alleviate the financial burden Passaro placed on the
twelve counties that host state correctional facilities,29 the Pennsyl-
289. Id. at -, 527 A.2d at 593-94. In McCain, the Commonwealth Court held that
proceedings commenced by nonlawyers on behalf of others are nullities and that pleadings
signed by nonlawyers on behalf of others are subject to being stricken.
290. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.6(a)(10) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
291. 56 Pa. Commw. 32, 424 A.2d 561 (1981) (en banc).
292. Id. at 42, 424 A.2d at 565.
293. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections currently operates fourteen state cor-
rectional institutions (SCIs) and state correctional facilities (SRCFs) located in the following
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vania General Assembly amended the Public Defender Act in 1981
to impose upon the sentencing counties the costs of providing counsel
to indigent parolees. " "
While Passaro solved the question of which public defender's
office would provide counsel to indigent parolees at Parole Board pa-
role revocation hearings, there still remained a problem for parolees
wanting counsel to represent them in appealing parole revocation or-
ders. Frequently, a parolee would commence an administrative or ju-
dicial appeal of an adverse parole revocation order while still housed
in one of the Department of Corrections' Diagnostic and Classifica-
tion Centers. " 5 Subsequent to the filing of such an appeal, the pa-
rolee would be classified by the Department and transferred to an-
other state correctional institution.
That is the factual scenario present in Brewer v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole,2 6 in which the parolee, Kent
Brewer, was incarcerated at the Eastern Diagnostic and Classifica-
tion Center at SCI-Graterford, in Montgomery County, when he
filed his pro se appeal of a Parole Board revocation order. Pursuant
to Passaro, the Commonwealth Court appointed the Montgomery
County Public Defender to represent him. Subsequently, Brewer was
classified and transferred to SCI-Rockview, in Centre County. Fol-
lowing his transfer, the Montgomery County Public Defender's office
petitioned the court to vacate its order appointing it to represent
Brewer and to appoint the Centre County Public Defender in its
stead. While Brewer joined in the Montgomery County Public De-
fender's request, the Centre County Public Defender's office opposed
counties: Allegheny (SCI-Pittsburgh); Cambria (SCI-Cresson); Centre (SCI-Rockview); Cum-
berland (SCI-Camp Hill); Green (SCI-Waynesburg); Huntingdon (SCI-Huntingdon and SCI-
Smithfield); Luzerne (SCI-Dallas and SCI-Retreat); Lycoming (SCI-Muncy); Mercer
(SRCF-Mercer); Montgomery (SCI-Graterford); Schuylkill (SCI-Frackville); and Westmore-
land (SCI-Greensburg). A fifteenth correctional institution, the former Eastern State Peniten-
tiary (later renamed SCI-Philadelphia), located in Philadelphia County, was closed by the
Commonwealth in 1970 and sold to the City of Philadelphia for one dollar in 1971. See 1986
PA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS ANN. REP. 54-57.
294. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.10a (Purdon Supp. 1986).
295. Diagnostic and Classification Centers are the Department of Corrections' initial
reception centers for prisoners committed to its jurisdiction. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 331.21a
(Purdon 1964) mandates that parole violators who were paroled from state correctional institu-
tions be incarcerated at the nearest diagnostic and classification center. The Department main-
tains three such centers for male prisoners: the Eastern center at SCI-Graterford in Montgom-
ery County; the Central center at SCI-Camp Hill in Cumberland County; and the Western
center at SCI-Pittsburgh in Allegheny County. The Diagnostic and Classification Center for
female prisoners is located at SCI-Muncy in Lycoming County. See 37 PA. CODE § 91.4
(1986). See also Hillanbrand v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 96 Pa. Commw.
484, 491 n.5, 508 A.2d 375, 379 n.5 (1986).
296. 90 Pa. Commw. 75, 494 A.2d 36 (1985).
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it.
The Commonwealth Court ruled that under Passaro, the situs
public defender's office was responsible for representing an indigent
parolee in an appeal of a Parole Board revocation order. According
to the Commonwealth Court, the situs is where the parolee is pres-
ently physically incarcerated, not where he was incarcerated at the
time the appeal was initially filed. In holding that the obligation to
represent Brewer transferred from Montgomery County to Centre
County upon Brewer's transfer from SCI-Graterford to SCI-
Rockview, the court wrote:
While our primary objective is to appoint effective counsel
for the prisoner, we also must weigh the logistical and economic
considerations in the choice of public defender offices. Even
though Centre [County] argues that there should be minimal
contacts necessary between counsel and Brewer now that the ap-
peal has been perfected, we believe the prisoner must have rea-
sonable access to this counsel even during the appeal period.297
The issue of where an indigent parolee can obtain counsel at the
various stages of the parole revocation process now seems settled.
The public defender's office of the county in which the parolee is
physically incarcerated is responsible for providing the parolee with
representation at the applicable stage of the parole revocation pro-
cess. It remains up to the parolee, however, to seek the services of
the public defender. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has
held on numerous occasions that the Parole Board is not responsible
for providing indigent parolees with counsel; it is only required to
provide parolees with the opportunity to obtain counsel.2 98 The Pa-
role Board is required to provide the parolee with the name and ad-
dress of the local public defender and also has a duty to notify the
public defender of pending parole hearings.299 It is then up to the
parolee to apply for the services of the public defender and provide
such information as is required under Section 6(b) of the Public De-
fender Act to satisfy the public defender that the parolee is indeed
indigent and qualifies for its services. The Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court has noted a parolee is not automatically "indigent"
297. Id. at 79, 494 A.2d at 38.
298. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw.
356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985); Passaro v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 56 Pa.
Commw. 32, 424 A.2d 561 (1981) (en bane). See also Patterson v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 215 Pa. Super. 532, 258 A.2d 693 (1969).
299. See 37 PA. CODE §§ 71.2(1)(iv), (5), (12)(v), (12)(vi), (15), 71.4(3)(ii), (3)(iii),
(4), (5)(iv) (1983).
PAROLE REVOCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA
and qualified to receive the services of a public defender by the mere
fact the parolee is incarcerated,300 but, once a parolee has applied to
the responsible public defender for legal representation and has qual-
ified as "indigent," the public defender is obliged to undertake repre-
sentation of the parolee and is not permitted to await a formal court
appointment.30 1
(b) Waiving counsel.-As with any right, constitutional or stat-
utory, the right to counsel may be waived by the parolee. The only
requirement imposed by the courts is that the parolee's waiver of
counsel must be knowing and voluntary. In Coades v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole,3 "s the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court held that a parolee may validly waive the right to counsel
without having an extensive on-the-record colloquy as required under
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 318 in probation violation
cases.303 The Commonwealth Court noted the distinction between
state parole cases coming under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pa-
role Board and probation violation cases held in common pleas
courts. The court reviewed the Parole Board's regulatory procedures
which ensure the parolee is informed of 1) the right to counsel; 2)
the availability of free counsel if indigent; 3) the name and address
of the local public defender; 4) the fact that he will in no way be
penalized for requesting counsel; and 5) documentation of the waiver
on a written waiver of counsel form, PBPP-72.3 04 The Common-
wealth Court found that this regulatory procedure adequately safe-
guarded the parolee's right to counsel, and when the regulatory
scheme is followed, the waiver will be deemed effective.30 5 The Com-
monwealth Court subsequently reaffirmed its holding in Coades in
Hill v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole.3 06
A parolee may also waive counsel without expressly doing so
and executing the PBPP-72. In O'Hara v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole,07 the parolee was deemed to have waived
300. See Santiago v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 96 Pa. Commw. 51,
52 n.I, 506 A.2d 517, 518 n.I (1986).
301. Blair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. -, 518
A.2d 899 (1986).
302. 84 Pa. Commw. 484, 480 A.2d 1298 (1984).
303. See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 271 Pa. Super. 138, 412 A.2d 614 (1979), appeal
after remand, 275 Pa. Super. 544, 419 A.2d 34 (1980).
304. 84 Pa. Commw. 484, 497-99, 480 A.2d 1298, 1305-06 (1984).
305. Id.
306. 89 Pa. Commw. 140, 492 A.2d 80 (1985), allowance to appeal denied, - Pa.
-, 524 A.2d 496 (1987).
307. 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985).
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counsel representation by his actions. There, the parolee, Thomas
O'Hara, was originally represented by a private attorney appointed
by the Erie County Common Pleas Court pursuant to Section 7 of
the Public Defender Act. 08 Following his conviction for murder and
weapons offenses, O'Hara was transferred from the Erie County
Prison to the Western Diagnostic and Classification Center at SCI-
Pittsburgh, in Allegheny County. The Parole Board scheduled a pa-
role revocation hearing at SCI-Pittsburgh and O'Hara's Erie County
defense counsel failed to appear. O'Hara refused to apply for the
services of the Allegheny County public defender, the proper office
under Passaro, and insisted upon being represented by this Erie
County attorney. After rescheduling his parole revocation hearing
five times, the Parole Board refused O'Hara a further continuance in
February 1982. O'Hara refused to further participate in the hearing
and the Parole Board proceeded to hold the hearing in absentia and
subsequently revoked his parole as a convicted parole violator.
O'Hara appealed that action, claiming his right to counsel had been
violated.
The Commonwealth Court disagreed and held that there comes
a time when the Parole Board is justified in refusing a parolee any
further continuances of a parole revocation hearing for the purpose
of procuring counsel. In so holding, the court limited the extent of its
1982 ruling in Brown v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role,309 in which it held that the Parole Board proceeds at its peril
when it refuses an unrepresented parolee a continuance of a parole
hearing in order to procure counsel. After failing to procure the pres-
ence of his desired attorney and refusing to avail himself of the ser-
vices of the local public defender after five continuances spanning
nearly eighteen months, the Commonwealth -Court held that the Pa-
role Board properly respected O'Hara's right to counsel. His failure
to participate and procure counsel at the sixth scheduled hearing was
deemed a de facto waiver of counsel.3 10
(c) Ensuring Counsel's Effectiveness.-In recent years, the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has scrutinized more closely the
performance of defense counsel in parole revocation cases to ensure
that the assistance they provide parolees is effective. In 1985, the
Commonwealth Court in LaCourt v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
308. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 9960.7 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
309. 70 Pa. Commw. 597, 453 A.2d 1068 (1982).
310. 87 Pa. Commw. 356, 370, 487 A.2d 90, 97 (1985).
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tion and Parole" ' adopted a two-tiered test for determining coun-
sel's effectiveness. The test, adopted from that set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,31 2 re-
quires that the parolee show 1) that counsel made errors so serious
that he or she was not functioning as "counsel" guaranteed by law;
and 2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the parolee's
defense.3"' In LaCourt, the court held that in order for a parolee to
show prejudice sufficient to make out a successful ineffectiveness
claim, the parolee must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the parole
revocation proceeding would have been different31 4
Like defendants in criminal appeals challenging the effective-
ness of their trial counsel,31 5 parolees bear the burden of proving
counsel's ineffectiveness." Also, the parolee is obliged to raise the
issue of counsel's alleged ineffective performance at the first stage of
the proceeding in which counsel whose ineffective performance is al-
leged is no longer representing the parolee or the claim is waived.311
Parolees have not been overly successful in pressing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the Commonwealth Court. The court
has rejected ineffectiveness claims of parolees based upon counsel's
failure to present alleged mitigating evidence at the revocation hear-
ing, 18 counsel's failure to provide the parolee with an advance copy
of the brief filed in an appellate court, 1 9 counsel's alleged misstate-
ment of the parolee's position in an appellate brief,320 and counsel's
alleged inadequate time to prepare for the parolee's revocation hear-
ing.3 21 In Vereen v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,
3 22
311. 87 Pa. Commmw. 384, 488 A.2d 70 (1985). See also Wile, Right to Counsel,
supra notes 173-76.
312. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
313. 87 Pa. Commw. at 392, 488 A.2d at 75. A similar test is used by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in the contest of probation revocation proceedings. See Commonwealth v.
Marchesano, 348 Pa. Super. 387, 502 A.2d 597 (1985).
314. 87 Pa. Commw. at 392, 488 A.2d at 75.
315. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shore, 487 Pa. 534, 410 A.2d 740 (1980).
316. Vereen v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 101 Pa. Commw. 63, 515
A.2d 637 (1986).
317. Id. at .... , 515 A.2d at 639-40. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372
A.2d 687 (1977) (criminal prosecution).
318. Pierce v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. __ ,
525 A.2d 1281 (1987).
319. Winters v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa. Commw. 236, 503
A.2d 488 (1986).
320. Toth v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 78 Pa. Commw. 19, 466 A.2d
782 (1983).
321. LaCourt v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 384, 488
A.2d 70 (1985).
322. 101 Pa. Commw. 63, 515 A.2d 637 (1987).
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the Commonwealth Court agreed with LeVance Vereen's contention
that his revocation hearing counsel was ineffective. There, defense
counsel failed to lodge a hearsay objection to a computer printout
from a drug laboratory that served as the basis of Vereen's subse-
quent recommitment as a parole violator. The court found that coun-
sel had no reasonable basis for omitting such a basic hearsay objec-
tion and that had the objection been made the outcome of the
revocation hearing would probably have been different since the doc-
ument was the sole basis for Vereen's recommitment. On the basis of
counsel's ineffective performance, the court held that Vereen was en-
titled to a new revocation hearing.
In reviewing ineffectiveness claims, the Commonwealth Court
seems to be following the rationale used by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme and Superior Courts in evaluating such claims in criminal
cases. Pennsylvania appellate courts give defense counsel the benefit
of the doubt when examining counsel's performance. If counsel had
some reasonable basis for the challenged action or strategy that was
designed to effectuate the client's interests, counsel will be found ef-
fective.823 While Vereen shows that it is possible for a parolee to
successfully challenge his or her counsel's effectiveness, it is clear
that a parolee attempting to do so shoulders a very heavy burden.
7. Right to a Prompt Hearing.-Traditionally, judicial over-
sight of the Parole Board's scheduling of parole revocation hearings
has focused primarily upon requiring the Parole Board to comply
with its own regulations regarding providing parolees with first and
second level violation and revocation hearings. The courts have rec-
ognized, however, that a prompt disposition of asserted parole viola-
tions is a due process right and an untimely parole violation hearing
constitutes a per se due process violation entitling the parolee to a
dismissal with prejudice of the asserted parole violations.324
In reviewing timeliness claims of parolees, the courts have
shown far more concern for conduct or events at the second level
violation or revocation hearings. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court has consistently held that if objections to the timeliness of the
first level preliminary or detention hearing are not made prior to the
323. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wells, - Pa. -, 521 A.2d 1388 (1987); Com-
monwealth v. Buehl, 510 Pa. 363, 508 A.2d 1167 (1986); Commonwealth v. Thomas, - Pa.
Super. -, 526 A.2d 380 (1987); Commonwealth v. McCabe, 359 Pa. Super. 566, 519 A.2d
497 (1986).
324. Capers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 42 Pa. Commw. 356, 400
A.2d 922 (1979) (en banc).
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second level or final violation or revocation hearing, the timeliness
objection is considered waived and the parolee has suffered a wrong
for which there is no remedy.385 In Donnelly v. Pennsylvania Board
of Probation and Parole,826 the Commonwealth Court held a parolee
may not object to the untimeliness of his preliminary hearing under
37 Pa. Code § 71.2(3) once parole has been revoked at a violation
hearing. Similarly, in Whittington v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole,3 27 the Commonwealth Court held that a parolee
who failed to object to the timeliness of his detention hearing prior
to his revocation hearing waived the timeliness claim and suffered a
wrong for which there is no remedy. The rationale of the Common-
wealth Court, as can be gleaned from its opinions, is that an illegal
detention will not invalidate an otherwise proper parole revocation. 8 8
Most of the appellate decisions dealing with timeliness issues
have involved the second level violation or revocation hearings. As
noted earlier, Parole Board regulations require the scheduling of a
second level hearing within 120 days of a triggering event."2 9 For a
violation hearing, the triggering event is the finding of probable
cause at the parole preliminary hearing.3 0 When a new criminal
conviction is the subject of a revocation hearing, the triggering event
is the official verification to the Parole Board of the guilty plea or
verdict. 331
The 120 day period has been interpreted to be an absolute time
limit, the violation of which is a per se due process violation entitling
the parolee to a dismissal of the asserted parole violations with
prejudice. 8 2 Thus, the 120 day rule for Parole Board cases differs
from that utilized by the common pleas court in probation and pa-
role revocation cases coming under their jurisdiction.833 Under the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a probation or parole violation hearing
must be held "as speedily as possible." The test for determining the
timeliness of a parole or probation violation hearing under the Rules
325. See. e.g., Nicastro v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 71 Pa. Commw.
532, 455 A.2d 295 (1983).
326. 72 Pa. Commw. 290, 457 A.2d 145 (1983).
327. 45 Pa. Commw. 658, 404 A.2d 782 (1979).
328. See. e.g., Anderson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 80 Pa.
Commw. 295, 471 A.2d 593 (1984), citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (an illegal
arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction).
329. See supra notes 128 and 152 and accompanying text.
330. See 37 PA. CODE § 71.2(11) (1986).
331. See 37 PA. CODE § 71.4(2) (1986).
332. See, e.g., Capers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 42 Pa. Commw.
356, 400 A.2d 922 (1979) (en banc).
333. See Pa. R. Crim. P., Rule 1409, 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
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of Criminal Procedure for due process purposes is to look at the facts
and circumstances of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and the
prejudice to the probationer or parolee. " 4 The Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court has defined "delay," within the context of a probation or
parole violation hearing, to mean the time from conviction to the
actual revocation hearing. " 5 According to the Superior Court's defi-
nition, if there is never a conviction, there can never be a delay, and
the revocation hearing is presumed timely. 3 6
The method of determining the timeliness of Parole Board viola-
tion and revocation hearings is more akin to the method used to cal-
culate compliance with the speedy trial rule of Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 1100. 1 Thus, unless a period of delay can be
directly attributed to the parolee, it is included in the calculation to
determine whether the revocation hearing was held within the 120
day period. The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has held that a
parolee's unavailability due to federal or out-of-state confinement is
not counted against the Parole Board for purposes of determining
compliance with the 120 day rule. 3 8
Pennsylvania appellate courts have consistently held that peri-
ods of delay attributed to continuance requests made by the parolee
or on his or her behalf are not counted in determining the timeliness
of subsequent violation or revocation hearings. The parolee does not
even have to know or agree to such a continuance request so long as
it is made on his or her behalf. For example, in Chancey v. Pennsyl-
vania Board of Probation and Parole,339 the parolee, Nicholas
Chancey, was charged by the Parole Board with various technical
parole violations while he was imprisoned in Philadelphia County on
new criminal charges. A parole preliminary hearing was scheduled
for April 28, 1981, at the Philadelphia House of Correction, but
Chancey was hospitalized at the time with a serious illness. An at-
torney from the Defender Association of Philadelphia, unbeknownst
to Chancey, requested a continuance of the preliminary hearing due
to his hospitalization. On four subsequent occasions the Parole Board
rescheduled Chancey's preliminary hearing and on each of those oc-
334. See Commonwealth v. Gochenaur, 331 Pa. Super. 187, 480 A.2d 307 (1984); Com-
monwealth v. Dorsey, 328 Pa. Super. 241, 476 A.2d 1308 (1984).
335. Commonwealth v. Donato, 353 Pa. Super. 37, 508 A.2d 1256 (1986).
336. Id. at 48, 508 A.2d at 1261; see also Commonwealth v. Reed, 277 Pa. Super. 94,
419 A.2d 677 (1980).
337. Pa. R. Crim. P., Rule 1100, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
338. See, e.g., Brown v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 70 Pa. Commw.
597, 453 A.2d 1068 (1982).
339. 83 Pa. Commw. 42, 477 A.2d 22 (1984).
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casions a public defender requested continuances due to his contin-
ued hospitalization. When the preliminary hearing was finally held
on November 6, 1981, Chancey voiced objections to the timeliness of
the preliminary hearing but did not object or otherwise complain
about the representation he received from the Philadelphia Defender
Association. The Parole Board overruled his timeliness objection
and, following the subsequent revocation of his parole, Chancey ap-
pealed the revocation order to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court, again claiming his preliminary hearing was untimely.
The Commonwealth Court rejected Chancey's argument that a
continuance request made by counsel is invalid unless it is made with
the parolee's full knowledge and consent. In upholding the timeliness
of the preliminary hearing and the validity of the continuance re-
quests made by the public defender, the court reasoned that:
[C]ontinuances are a matter of sound trial strategy within
the reasonable purview of counsel. To hold that counsel cannot
unilaterally request continuances that would delay a hearing be-
yond the time imposed by the [Parole] Board's regulations
would severely hamper counsel's ability to effectuate trial
strategy." '
In response to Chancey's contention that the continuance request
was invalid because he had not yet engaged the services of the De-
fender's Association at the time the requests were made, the court
held that the Parole Board, like a court, is entitled to proceed on the
basis that a lawyer as an officer of the court represents the person
the lawyer purports to represent. 84 1 The fact that Chancey was rep-
resented throughout his initial parole revocation proceedings by the
Philadelphia Defender Association undoubtedly diluted his argument
that the public defender did not act on his behalf when the continu-
ances were requested. By accepting the services of the Philadelphia
Defender's Association, Chancey could be seen to have ratified the
actions taken by the public defender on his behalf.42
Thus, while delays attributable to the parolee or the parolee's
counsel are clearly excluded from determining whether the Parole
Board complied with the 120 day rule, the significance of delays at-
tributable to the Parole Board is not as clear cut. The Parole Board's
340. Id. at 47, 477 A.2d at 24-25 (citations omitted).
341. Id. at 47, 477 A.2d at 24.
342. Cf. SEI Corporation v. Norton & Company, 631 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(affirmance of an attorney's unauthorized act may be inferred by the client's failure to repudi-
ate it). See also Pueblo of Santo Domingo v. United States, 647 F.2d 1087 (Ct. Cl. 1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 94 (1958).
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regulation dealing with computing the period in which it must pro-
vide parolees with hearings now excludes from that computation
"[rleasonable or necessary continuances granted to, or occurrences
related to, the [Parole] Board or its employees." 4" The appellate
courts have exercised a greater scrutiny in determining timeliness
issues where the delays have been due to actions of the Parole Board.
In Capers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,"'
the Parole Board delayed James Capers' parole violation hearing on
two occasions. The first delay was made to accommodate the parole
agent's vacation plans. The second delay was occasioned by the pa-
role agent's unavailability due to injuries from an assault the day
prior to the scheduled parole violation hearing. In Capers, the Com-
monwealth Court held that the delay occasioned by both the agent's
vacation and the assault counted against the Parole Board for timeli-
ness purposes. Since the parolee's violation hearing was held outside
of the 120 day limit, the court reversed the parole revocation order
and mandated that Capers' parole be reinstated. While the Parole
Board's regulation (as it existed at the time of Capers) did not in-
clude an exclusion for reasonable or necessary continuances or oc-
currences related to the Parole Board or its employees, 4 ' such an
exclusion would have only served to eliminate the second delay,
caused by the assault upon the parole agent. The first delay, made to
accommodate the parole agent's vacation plans, would probably not
be considered either "reasonable" or "necessary" and would still be
considered as included in the time computation to determine
timeliness.
The decisions indicate a judicial willingness to hold parolees ac-
countable for delays initiated or caused by them in holding parole
revocation hearings. The Commonwealth Court is also willing to
charge against the Parole Board delays over which a parolee has no
control or for which there are no reasonable grounds. While the
courts have shown considerable deference to the Parole Board's ex-
planations of delays attributable to its agents and employees, the
courts have also served notice that the Parole Board's discretion in
this area is not unbridled and that the sanction of vacating a parole
revocation order will be imposed if the Parole Board violates a pa-
343. 37 PA. CODE § 71.5(i)(3) (1986).
344. 42 Pa. Commw. 50, 400 A.2d 922 (1979) (en banc).
345. Following the Commonwealth Court's decision in Capers, the Parole Board
amended 37 PA. CODE § 71.5(i) to include subsection (3). allowing for the exclusion of delays
in holding parole hearings due to reasonable and necessary continuances occasioned by the
Parole Board or its employees. See 12 Pa. Bull. 3290 (1982).
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rolee's right to a timely revocation hearing.
IV. Review of Parole Revocation Decisions
Parole revocation orders are subject to appellate review, both at
the agency and the judicial level. By comparison, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court in its Reiders" decision held that Parole
Board orders denying prisoners' applications for parole are not sub-
ject to review. Since the 1980 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
in Bronson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,47 ap-
peals from Parole Board revocation orders are heard by the Pennsyl-
vania Commonwealth Court in the same manner as appeals from
final orders of any other Commonwealth administrative agency. Pre-
viously, the Commonwealth Court had heard such appeals as man-
damus actions under its original jurisdiction.
A. Administrative Remedies
Prior to seeking judicial review of a Parole Board revocation or-
der, a parolee must first seek redress from the Parole Board itself
through an administrative appeal process. In its 1985 decision in St.
Clair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,8 the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court held that the exhaustion doctrine is
fully applicable to appeals of parole revocation orders. Thus, before
a parolee may file a petition for review with the Pennsylvania Com-
monwealth Court of a parole revocation order, the parolee is first
required to exhaust his or her administrative remedies.
Prior to Act 134, the sole administrative remedy with the Parole
Board is a process it terms "administrative relief. '3 49 Parolees were
required to file petitions for administrative relief with the Parole
Board within thirty days from the mailing date of the parole revoca-
tion order from which relief is sought. The petition must be actually
received by the Parole Board within the thirty day appeal period and
late appeals were routinely denied by the Parole Board as un-
timely.3 50 There is no "mailbox rule" in connection with the adminis-
trative relief process where the Parole Board would consider the date
346. Reider v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw....
514 A.2d 967 (1986) (en banc).
347. 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
348. 89 Pa. Commw. 561, 493 A.2d 146 (1985).
349. See 37 PA. CODE § 71.5(h) (1986). See also supra note 164 and accompanying
text.
350. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 89 Pa.
Commw. 576, 492 A.2d 1202 (1985).
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of mailing as the date of receipt of an appeal.-"" The petition for
administrative relief was processed by the Parole Board's Hearing
Review Division, which made a recommendation to the Parole Board
for final disposition. The thirty day appeal period for filing a petition
for review with the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court commenced
when the answer to the administrative relief petition was mailed by
the Parole Board.3 5'
This procedure was changed in 1986 by the passage of Act 134.
Act 134 created a statutory administrative appeal procedure
whereby administrative appeals would be heard by three members of
the Parole Board. The Parole Board is presently promulgating regu-
lations designed to implement the changes wrought by Act 134.353 In
its proposed regulations, the Parole Board establishes a bifurcated
administrative appeal and relief process. Direct appeals, i.e., those
pertaining to issues involving actual parole revocation orders, are
handled by the three member panels specified by Act 134. Matters
not appealable under Act 134 may still be the subject of an adminis-
trative relief petition. Items that may conceivably come under ad-
ministrative "relief" would be time credit claims that normally do
not arise until after a parole revocation order has been issued. While
the regulations do not so state, it can be presumed that administra-
tive relief petitions will continue to be processed by the Hearing Re-
view Division. The proposed regulations empower the Parole Board
to designate an entity other than itself to dispose of administrative
relief matters.
Under both the present and proposed regulations, in order to
obtain administrative review a parolee is directed to submit a clear
statement of the factual and legal grounds for the appeal. Under the
proposed regulations, failure to state clearly and accurately the fac-
tual and legal grounds for the appeal is a possible basis for denying
the appeal.' 5' In addition, under the Administrative Agency Law 55
and the Rules of Appellate Procedure, 56 the failure to raise an issue
during the administrative process constitutes a waiver of that issue
for purposes of judicial review. 57
351. Id. at 577-78, 492 A.2d at 1202-03. See also I PA. CODE § 31.11 (1986).
352. 37 PA. CODE § 71.5(h) (1986). See also Pa. R. App. P. 1512(a), 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
353. See supra notes 162 and 163 and accompanying text.
354. - Pa. Bull. - (1987), proposed 37 PA. CODE §§ 73.1(a)(3) and 73.1(b)(2)
(Parole Board draft regulation dated December 8, 1986).
355. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 703(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
356. Pa. R. App. P., Rule 1551(a), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
357. See, e.g., Lantzy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa. Commw.
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In adopting the exhaustion doctrine to parole revocation ap-
peals, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found that the admin-
istrative relief process currently embodied in the Parole Board's reg-
ulations 358 provided parolees with an adequate and meaningful
administrative remedy.3" The proposed regulations set forth a more
specific procedure for seeking redress from parole revocation orders
in the administrative setting. Thus, while the proposed regulations
tighten up the administrative appeal procedure, they also offer a
more meaningful administrative remedy than that currently found
adequate by the Commonwealth Court.
The policy rationale for adopting the exhaustion doctrine to pa-
role revocation appeals is two-fold. First, by requiring parolees to
first seek redress from the Parole Board, the court gives the Parole
Board the opportunity to correct its own errors, thus possibly reliev-
ing some of the pressure on the court's own appeal docket.360 Sec-
ondly, the courts are availing themselves of the specialized expertise
of the Parole Board in this area of the law.36' Therefore, the exhaus-
tion of the administrative appeal process with the Parole Board is an
essential prerequisite to obtaining judicial review of a parole revoca-
tion order.
B. Judicial Review
Exclusive jurisdiction over actions involving Parole Board revo-
cation orders lies with the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.3 62 In
Bronson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that such appeals
are properly treated as appeals from final orders of Commonwealth
agencies under the appellate jurisdiction of the Commonwealth
Court. 63 This is the exclusive method by which a parolee may ob-
tain judicial review of a Parole Board revocation order. In Common-
wealth v. Fells,3 64 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
Post Hearing Conviction Act (PCHA) 36" was not applicable to Pa-
role Board revocation orders. Likewise, in Commonwealth ex rel. Bi-
626, 477 A.2d 18 (1984).
358. 37 PA. CODE § 71.5(h) (1986).
359. St. Clair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 89 Pa. Commw. 561, 569,
493 A.2d 146, 152 (1985).
360. See, e.g., Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34 (1972).
361. See. e.g., A & B Wiper Supply, Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 514
F. Supp. 1145 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
362. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763(a)(1) (Purdon 1982).
363. 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981).
364. - Pa. -, 518 A.2d 544 (1986).
365. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 9541-9551 (Purdon 1982).
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glow v. Ashe,3"6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that Pa-
role Board revocation orders are not reviewable by way of a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. There is no case whereby a parolee's
attempt to circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction of the Common-
wealth Court over Parole Board orders has met with any success in
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
I. Prerequisites to Judicial Appeal.-As noted in the preced-
ing section, a parolee desiring judicial review of the propriety of a
Parole Board revocation order must first exhaust the administrative
appeal process available with that agency. Only after the Parole
Board has acted on the administrative appeal will an appellate court
grant judicial review of the matter.
Once the Parole Board has issued its decision on a parolee's ad-
ministrative appeal, the parolee has thirty days from the date of
mailing of the Parole Board's decision in which to file a petition for
review with the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.3 67 The thirty-
day appeal period is mandated by the Rules of Appellate Procedure
and is jurisdictional in nature. " If the petition for review is filed
even one day late, the appeal is untimely and the appellate court is
deprived of jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal.36 9 The
date of mailing of the petition for review can serve as the date of
filing if the parolee attaches a certificate of mailing (United States
Postal Service Form 3817), showing the date of mailing and the pa-
role number of the Parole Board's order, or mails such a certificate
separately to the prothonotary. 70
The Rules of Appellate Procedure also specify the form and
content of the petition for review .8 7 Pa.R.A.P. 1513(b) requires that
the government unit whose determination is sought to be reviewed,
366. 348 Pa. 409, 35 A.2d 341 (1944). See also Gillespie v. Department of Corrections,
- Pa. Commw. - 527 A.2d 1061 (1987).
367. Pa. R. App. P., Rule 1512(a), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987). However,
when the Parole Board fails to place a mailing date on its response to an administrative ap-
peal, the thirty day appeal period of Rule 1512(a) does not apply. Wagner v. Pennsylvania
Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. - 522 A.2d 155 (1987).
368. See, e.g., Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 505 Pa. 8, 476
A.2d 364 (1984).
369. Hillanbrand v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 96 Pa. Commw. 484,
508 A.2d 375 (1986); St. Clair v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 89 Pa.
Commw. 561, 493 A.2d 146 (1985); Manuel v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,
76 Pa. Commw. 270, 463 A.2d 1236 (1983).
370. Rule 1514(a), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987). In Sheets v. Department of
Public Welfare, 84 Pa. Commw. 388, 479 A.2d 80 (1984), the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court held that a certified mail form (United States Postal Service Form 3800) bearing a
mailing date stamp or postmark by postal authorities will satisfy this rule.
371. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1513(a), (b), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
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shall be named as a respondent. In cases involving the Parole Board,
the respondent is always the Parole Board and should never be the
individual members of the agency. The petition for review itself must
contain the following:
1. A statement of the basis for the court's jurisdiction. In state
parole cases the basis is Section 763(a)(1) of the Judicial Code;
2. The name of the party seeking review, i.e., the parolee;
3. The name of the government unit that made the determina-
tion sought to be reviewed. In state parole cases it will always be
the Parole Board;
4. A reference to the order or other determination sought to be
reviewed, which in state parole cases is the denial of administra-
tive relief and should be identified by the parole number as-
signed by the Parole Board and the recording or mailing date of
the order;
5. A general statement of the issues sought to be presented to
the appellate court; and
6. A short statement of the relief sought by the parolee."'
The petition for review must be filed with proof of service."' When a
parolee is applying to proceed in forma pauperis, an indigency affida-
vit must accompany the petition for review; otherwise, the appropri-
ate filing fee must be paid. 74
2. Scope of Judicial Review.-An appellate court's power of
review over a Parole Board revocation order is expressly limited by
the Administrative Agency Law. Under Section 703(a) of the Ad-
ministrative Agency Law,"7 ' an appellate court may not consider an
issue on judicial review that was not raised before the Parole Board.
Additionally, the Rules of Appellate Procedure preclude considera-
tion of issues not first addressed to the applicable agency.3 76 Thus, in
Seifrit v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,3 77 the Penn-
sylvania Commonwealth Court held that a parolee waived the issue
of the sufficiency of the tests utilized by the Parole Board's labora-
372. Id.
373. Pa. R.A.P., Rule 1514(a), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987). See also
Pa.R.A.P., Rule 121, 122, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
374. See generally Pa.R.A.P., Rule 551-561, 2701, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon
1987).
375. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 703(a) (Purdon Supp. 1986).
376. See Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1551(a), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. (Purdon 1987).
377. - Pa. Commw. - , 514 A.2d 654 (1986).
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tory by failing to raise the issue on administrative appeal. Likewise,
in Lantzy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,3 8 the
same court held that a parolee waived the issue of the sufficiency of
a good cause finding to allow a parole agent's affidavit in evidence
and denying the parolee the right to confront and cross-examine the
agent by failing to raise that issue on administrative appeal. The
Commonwealth Court found that the parolee in Harper v. Pennsyl-
vania Board of Probation and Parole"7 9 waived alleged technical de-
fects in his arrest and detention by the Parole Board by failing to
raise them at his parole violation hearing or on administrative ap-
peal. Thus, an appellate court is limited on judicial review to consid-
eration of only those issues that were raised before the Parole Board
and that the agency had an opportunity to consider.
Of those issues which are properly preserved for judicial review,
the appellate court's scope of review is further restricted by Section
704 of the Administrative Agency Law.380 Under Section 704, an
appellate court is required to affirm a Parole Board revocation order
unless that court determines, 1) that a necessary finding is unsup-
ported by substantial evidence; 2) that the Parole Board made an
error of law; or 3) that a constitutional right of the parolee was
violated. 881
The "substantial evidence" test is thus the standard used by the
appellate court to ascertain whether the Parole Board's findings have
proper evidentiary support consistent with notions of due process.
"Substantial evidence" has been judicially defined as "such evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion . . . something more than a scintilla creating a mere suspicion
of the existence of the fact to be established."38 The test is a fairly
easy one for the Parole Board to meet. In applying the test, the court
reviews all of the evidence in the record that tends to support the
Parole Board's findings to determine if, as a whole, it is adequate to
support the findings. The court does not consider conflicting evi-
dence, nor does it review the Parole Board's credibility determina-
378. 82 Pa. Commw. 626, 477 A.2d 18 (1984).
379. - Pa. Commw. - , 520 A.2d 518 (1987).
380. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 704 (Purdon Supp. 1986).
381. See, e.g., O'Hara v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw.
356, 487 A.2d 90 (1985); Zazo v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 80 Pa.
Commw. 198, 470 A.2d 1135 (1984). See generally Estate of McGovern v. State Employees'
Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377, 517 A.2d 523 (1986) (appellate court's scope of review is
strictly limited by 2 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 704 (Purdon Supp. 1986) to determining whether
that finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record).
382. Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 49, 54,
484 A.2d 413, 416 (1984).
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tions or weighing of the evidence.
Conflicting evidence is not considered by the appellate court for
a number of reasons. The focus in the substantial evidence test is on
that evidence which tends to support the agency's findings. The vital-
ity of the alternative "capricious disregard of competent evidence"
test, used by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court when the party
with the burden of proof has not prevailed before the agency, was
called into question by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in favor of
the exclusivity of the substantial evidence test.38 3 Since the Parole
Board bears the burden of proving asserted parole violations by a
preponderance of the evidence, the capricious disregard test was not
usually applicable to appeals of parole revocation orders. Another
reason conflicting evidence in the record is not reviewed by the ap-
pellate court is the position of the Parole Board as the ultimate fact-
finder. On numerous occasions, the Commonwealth Court has stated
that it will not review the Parole Board's credibility determinations
or its weighing of evidence since such functions are solely within its
discretion as the fact-finding agency and are not proper functions of
a reviewing court. 84 For that reason, the Pennsylvania Common-
wealth Court has held in the area of administrative law that the
presence of conflicting evidence in the record does not deprive an
agency's findings of support by substantial evidence. 85
While the substantial evidence test is not difficult for the Parole
Board to meet, it does require satisfaction of some minimal stan-
dards in order to comport with notions of administrative due process.
In order to constitute "substantial evidence," the evidence in the rec-
ord must be both relevant and competent. Although hearsay evi-
dence is admissible in parole revocation proceedings upon a showing
of good cause,3 86 Pennsylvania appellate courts have held since 1976
.383. See Estate of McGovern v. State Employees' Retirement Board, 512 Pa. 377, 517
A.2d 523 (1986). A "capricious disregard of competent evidence" was defined as the disbelief
of testimony or evidence that someone of ordinary intelligence could not possibly challenge or
entertain the slightest doubt as to its truth. See Brennan v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 87 Pa. Commw. 265, 270, 487 A.2d 73, 77 (1985). There is a question
whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court really meant to abolish the "capricious disregard"
standard in Estate of McGovern. Since deciding Estate of McGovern, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court itself has used the "capricious disregard" test. See, e.g., Farquhar v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeal Board (Corning Glass Works), - Pa. A.2d - (No. 53
W.D. Appeal Docket 1986, filed July 9, 1987).
384. See, e.g., Harper v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa.
Commw. -, , 520 A.2d 518, 520 (1987); Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 49, 54, 484 A.2d 413, 416 (1984).
385. See, e.g., Chapman, Id. at 54, 484 A.2d at 416; Kells v. Unemployment Compensa-
tion Board of Review, 32 Pa. Commw. 142, 378 A.2d 495 (1977).
386. Sinwell v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 46 Pa. Commw. 429, 432,
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that hearsay evidence, standing alone, is not competent to support an
agency finding.87 Additionally, both of Pennsylvania's intermediate
appellate courts have specifically held that a finding of a violation of
parole or probation based entirely upon hearsay evidence violates
due process.388 However, since the technical rules of evidence do not
apply to parole revocation proceedings,38 other than the use of hear-
say, the Parole Board generally has wide latitude in the types of evi-
dence it may utilize in satisfying its burden of proof.
In reviewing the record for evidentiary support for Parole Board
findings, the Commonwealth Court has indicated that certain types
of evidence may constitute substantial evidence as a matter of law.
Case law indicates that the court accepts the following types of evi-
dence as substantial evidence in parole revocation cases: 1) a pa-
rolee's admission on the record;3'0 2) a parole agent's testimony of a
parolee's admission made off the record; 9 1 3) certified copies of
court records;" and 4) photographic copies of public records.393 The
Commonwealth Court has indicated that business records would also
constitute substantial evidence to support a Parole Board finding that
a parolee violated parole.39
The court's review of the Parole Board's findings is made more
difficult by the lack of a requirement for it to make specific findings
of fact and conclusions of law as part of its parole revocation orders.
406 A.2d 597, 599 (1979).
387. Vann v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 508 Pa. 139, 494 A.2d
1081 (1985); Burks v. Department of Public Welfare, 48 Pa. Commw. 6, 408 A.2d 974
(1979); Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa. Commw. 522, 367
A.2d 366 (1976).
388. Grello v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 83 Pa. Commw. 252, 477
A.2d 45 (1984); Commonwealth v. Greenlee, 263 Pa. Super. 477, 398 A.2d 676 (1979).
389. See 2 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 505 (Purdon Supp. 1986). This statute provides:
§505. Evidence and cross-examination.
Commonwealth agencies shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence
at agency hearings, and all relevant evidence of reasonably probative value may
be received. Reasonable examination and cross-examination shall be permitted.
Id. This provision of the Administrative Agency Law is not limited to "adjudications" and is
therefore applicable to Parole Board proceedings.
390. Pitch v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 100 Pa. Commw. 114, 514
A.2d 638 (1986); Heckrote v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 77 Pa. Commw.
131, 465 A.2d 118 (1983).
391. Falsaco v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. -,
521 A.2d 991 (1987).
392. LaCourt v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 87 Pa. Commw. 384, 488
A.2d 70 (1985); Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 49,
484 A.2d 413 (1984).
393. Anderson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 91 Pa. Commw. 486, 497
A.2d 947 (1985); Davis v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 85 Pa. Commw. 278,
481 A.2d 714 (1984).
394. Whitmore v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa. Commw. 569,
504 A.2d 401 (1986).
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Section 507 of the Administrative Agency Laws9s requires other
commonwealth agencies to make such findings and conclusions as a
precondition to the validity of their adjudications. By its very defini-
tion of "adjudication," the Administrative Agency Law excludes pa-
role revocation proceedings from most, but not all, of the procedural
requirements of the Administrative Agency Law.896 On numerous
occasions, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has sharply criti-
cized the Parole Board for the language and style used in its parole
revocation orders and has recommended a certain format in lieu of
the specific findings and conclusions mandated by Section 507.89"
395. See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 507 (Purdon Supp. 1986). This statute provides:
§ 507. Contents and service of adjudications.
All adjudications of a Commonwealth agency shall be in writing, shall con-
tain findings and the reasons for the adjudication, and shall be served upon all
parties or their counsel personally, or by mail.
Id.
396. A discussion of the definition -of "adjudication" and its ramifications on the applica-
bility of the Administrative Agency Law on Parole Board revocation proceedings is found at
note 264 and accompanying text. Of the procedural sections of the Administrative Agency
Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-508 (Purdon Supp. 1986), that pertain to agency hear-
ings, Sections 504 and 506 through and including 508 are limited by their terms to "adjudica-
tions" and have been held not applicable to Parole Board revocation proceedings. See Davis v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 85 Pa. Commw. 278, 481 A.2d 714 (1984).
Sections 502 (pertaining to representation by counsel) and 505 (pertaining to evidence and
cross-examination) deal only with Commonwealth agencies and their hearings and have been
held to be applicable to Parole Board proceedings. See Pitch v. Pennsylvania Board of Proba-
tion and Parole, 100 Pa. Commw. 114, 514 A.2d 638 (1986) (Parole Board could properly
consider parolee's solicited admission to technical parole violations under Section 505); Coades
v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 84 Pa. Commw. 484, 480 A.2d 1298 (1984)
(parolee's right to counsel at Parole Board revocation proceedings partially founded in Section
502). In Bronson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held the appeal
provisions of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 701-704 (Purdon
Supp. 1986), were applicable to the Parole Board's revocation proceedings despite statutory
language addressing appeals from "adjudications" of Commonwealth agencies. The Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court has never clarified the status of Parole Board revocation orders vis-a-vis
the Administrative Agency Law. One possible rationale that reconciles Bronson with the defi-
nition of "adjudication" in 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (Purdon Supp. 1986) is to apply the
exclusion from definition of parole orders dealing with parole applications while including as
adjudications parole orders dealing with parole revocations. Although the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has had several opportunities in which to do so, it has not rationalized Bronson
with the Administrative Agency Law's definition of "adjudication" so as to justify its holding
applying Sections 701 through 704 of the Administrative Agency Law to the Parole Board's
revocation proceedings. See Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa.
248, 501 A.2d 1110 (1985); Cox v. Board of Probation and Parole, 507 Pa. 614, 493 A.2d 680
(1985).
397. See, e.g., Macik v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw.
-, 526 A.2d 460 (1987) (case remanded where Parole Board failed to make a specific
finding on parolee's legitimate or unlawful use of utility knife found on his person); Wagner v.
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. -, 522 A.2d 155 (1987)
(case remanded where Parole Board's use of term "unexpired term" in revocation order was
unclear in light of multiple classes of parole violations); Kramer v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. - , 521 A.2d 975 (1987) (Commonwealth Court
will not affirm a Parole Board revocation order that is vague and ambiguous with respect to
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Other than reviewing the evidentiary support for the Parole
Board's findings, an appellate court is limited to determining
whether the Parole Board committed an error of law or violated a
constitutional right of a parolee in its revocation order. Issues con-
cerning the Parole Board's alleged errors of law usually center upon
its interpretation of the Parole Act or of its own regulations. With
respect to the Parole Board's interpretation of its own regulations,
Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that an agency's interpre-
tation of its own regulations is entitled to controlling weight as long
as the interpretation is consistent with the regulation and the ena-
bling legislation.3 98 In view of such a doctrine, challenging the Parole
Board's interpretation of either its own regulations or of the Parole
Act does not offer a parolee much promise of success, although there
have been some notable exceptions. 99
Issues concerning the Parole Board's compliance with its own
regulations hold more promise for success for parolees. The courts
have held that the Parole Board, like other agencies, is required to
comply with its own regulations. 00 When it has failed to do so, the
decisions from the appellate courts are mixed on the appropriate
sanctions used to punish such noncompliance."'
3. Judicial Deference to Parole Board Discretion.-One of the
the amount and service of backtime ordered); Pitt v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole, 97 Pa. Commw. 116, 508 A.2d 1314 (1986) (vague parole revocation orders will be
construed against the Parole Board); Counts v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole,
87 Pa. Commw. 277, 487 A.2d 450 (1985) (Parole Board practice of coining its own terms of
art and using them without providing definitions is strongly disapproved of when parolees and
others outside of the agency must guess at their meaning); Lewis v. Pennsylvania Board of
Probation and Parole, 74 Pa. Commw. 335, 459 A.2d 1339 (1983) (Commonwealth Court
should not be required to decipher a Parole Board revocation order).
398. Wagner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 92 Pa. Commw. 132, 498
A.2d 1007 (1985); Gundy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa. Commw.
618, 478 A.2d 139 (1984).
399. See, e.g., Rivenbark v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 509 Pa. 248,
501 A.2d 1110 (1985) (Parole Board's interpretation of Section 21.1 of the Parole Act errone-
ous); Cox v. Board of Probation and Parole, 507 Pa. 614, 493 A.2d 680 (1985) (Parole
Board's interpretation of "at liberty on parole" language contained in Section 21.1(a) of the
Parole Act erroneous).
400. Kunkelman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 40 Pa. Commw. 149,
396 A.2d 898 (1979). Cf. Smith Klein Beckman Corp. v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. Commw.
437, 482 A.2d 1344 (1983) (en banc), affd, 508 Pa. 359, 498 A.2d 374 (1985) (administrative
agencies must follow their own published regulations).
401. Compare Capers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 42 Pa. Commw.
356, 400 A.2d 922 (1979) (en banc) (the court dismissed asserted technical parole violations
with prejudice as a result of the Parole Board's failure to provide a parolee with a Violation
Hearing within 120 days) with Hartman v. Petsock, 97 Pa. Commw. 311, 509 A.2d 935
(1986) and LaBoy v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 74 Pa. Commw. 332, 459
A.2d 916 (1983) (court ordered new hearing as a result of the Parole Board's failure to allow
a parolee to revoke a prior waiver of a full Board hearing).
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hallmarks of the reported decisions reviewing Parole Board orders is
the great deference that the courts have traditionally given to the
Parole Board's exercise of discretion. The acts of the Parole Board
that the judiciary considers discretionary range from the decision
whether to revoke parole to weighing evidence and determining the
appropriate backtime to be imposed for parole violations. The only
time a court will reverse or modify a discretionary act of the Parole
Board is when it has abused its discretion."0 2
The abuse of discretion standard is a difficult one for a parolee
to meet. When the Parole Board has acted within its recognized
range of discretion, there are numerous appellate court decisions
which hold that the judiciary will not review or otherwise second-
guess the Parole Board's actions. For example, when the Parole
Board has imposed backtime for proven parole violations and the
backtime imposed is within the published presumptive range for the
violations, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has held on sev-
eral occasions that it will not review the Parole Board's exercise of
discretion.40 8 As noted earlier, the weighing of evidence and evalua-
tion of witness credibility are also discretionary functions of the Pa-
role Board which will not be reviewed upon appeal. "04
There are areas where the courts will examine the Parole
Board's exercise of discretion. One of those is finding good cause to
deny parolees the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses.40 5 Another is the justification for imposing backtime for pa-
role violations in excess of the published presumptive ranges.4 °0 The
test set forth for determining whether the Parole Board has abused
its discretion is whether the discretionary act is supported by sub-
stantial evidence in the record.40  Thus, in those cases where sub-
402. See, e.g., Cox v. Board of Probation and Parole, 507 Pa. 614, 493 A.2d 680 (1985);
Bradshaw v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 75 Pa. Commw. 90, 461 A.2d 342
(1983).
403. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 88 Pa. Commw.
547, 490 A.2d 942 (1985); Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa.
Commw. 49, 484 A.2d 413 (1984).
404. Coleman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa. Commw. -,
515 A.2d 1004 (1986); Sigafoos v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa.
Commw. 454, 502 A.2d 1076 (1986).
405. See, e.g., Wagner v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 92 Pa. Commw.
132, 498 A.2d 1007 (1985); Tyson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 84 Pa.
Commw. 326, 479 A.2d 52 (1984).
406. See, e.g., Harper v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa.
Commw. - 520 A.2d 518 (1987).
407. Chapman v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 86 Pa. Commw. 49, 57-
8, 484 A.2d 413, 418 (1984). See generally Appeal of Mutual Supply Co., 366 Pa. 424, 77
A.2d 612 (1951).
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW FALL 1987
stantial evidence was found to support the discretionary actions of
the Parole Board, the court held that there was no abuse of discre-
tion.408 Conversely, where the challenged actions lacked such eviden-
tiary support, the court found an abuse of discretion and the Parole
Board's action was reversed. 09
4. Further Judicial Review.-If a parolee remains dissatisfied
with the Commonwealth Court's decision, the only avenue open for
further review is an appeal by allowance to the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court. Over the past several years, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has systematically classified challenges to actions of the Parole
Board as within the Commonwealth Court's appellate jurisdiction
and not the court's original jurisdiction. 10 As a result, the availabil-
ity of direct appeal to the Supreme Court of parole matters is now
practically nonexistent.
As noted earlier,41 a direct appeal is a parolee's exclusive ave-
nue to challenge a Parole Board revocation order since the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court held that neither the Post Conviction Hearing
Act (PCHA) nor habeas corpus proceedings are available as meth-
ods to challenge a Parole Board revocation order. Therefore, preserv-
ing that direct appeal is of critical importance to the parolee.
V. Conclusion
This article illustrates that the parole revocation process in
Pennsylvania can not be categorized as either strictly criminal law or
administrative law. Rather, it is a hybrid of the two. While the Pa-
role Board's revocation process is based upon administrative law, pa-
rolees are provided with protections and guarantees not afforded liti-
gants in other administrative proceedings. Examples of such
protections are the right to effective assistance of counsel and the
right to free counsel if indigent. The different treatment afforded pa-
rolees can be traced to the nature of the interest involved in the pa-
role revocation process, a liberty interest, as opposed to the property
408. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 94 Pa. Commw.
200, 503 A.2d 483 (1986).
409. See, e.g., Carthon v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, - Pa.
Commw. -, 512 A.2d 799 (1986).
410. See McMahon v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 504 Pa. 240, 470
A.2d 1337 (1983) (parolee's application for time credit addressed to appellate, not original,
jurisdiction of Commonwealth Court); Bronson v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Pa-
role, 491 Pa. 549, 421 A.2d 1021 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050 (1981) (challenge to
Parole Board revocation order addressed to appellate, not original jurisdiction of Common-
wealth Court).
411. See supra notes 364 and 366 and accompanying text.
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interests that are the subject of all other administrative proceedings.
In contrast, while parole revocation proceedings are a part of the
criminal justice system, they are not criminal prosecutions; thus, pa-
rolees are not provided with the same protections and safeguards as
are criminal defendants. For example, the exclusionary rule, so much
a part of a criminal prosecution, is not applicable to parole revoca-
tion proceedings. 412  Also, the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy does not apply to parole revocation proceedings
since parole revocations are civil administrative, not criminal, pro-
ceedings. Additionally, a parolee does not have the protection of re-
quiring the Commonwealth to prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt. Rather, a parole violation must be proven by only a prepon-
derance of the evidence, a much easier burden for the Common-
wealth to meet.
The trend is towards increased importance in the criminal jus-
tice system for probation and parole. In 1986, the Parole Board was
supervising more parolees and probationers than the entire inmate
population in the fifteen state correctional institutions and facilities
operated by the Department of Corrections.4 13 Facing a shortage of
cell space, it is only a matter of time until incarceration is a punish-
ment to be reserved only for the most hardened and violent offend-
ers, with a greater number being placed in some kind of probation or
parole status. Unfortunately, if past history is any prediction of fu-
ture behavior, the number of parole and probation violators will in-
crease proportionately with the number of parolees and probationers.
As a result, there should be an increase, rather than a decrease, of
parole revocation litigation in the future, thus ensuring a continuing
evolution of this area of the law.
412. Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973). Nickens v. Pennsylva-
nia Board of Probation and Parole, 93 Pa. Commw. 313, 502 A.2d 277 (1985). Cf. Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. -, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (fourth amendment's warrant and probable
cause requirements do not apply to probationers).
413. See 1986 PA. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS ANN. REP. 21; 1985 PA. BD. OF PROBATION
& PAROLE ANN. REP. 26-27.

